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The following motions for resolution were referred to the Political Affairs 
Committee by plenary at its sittings on: 
9 March 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SCHALL and others on 
European political cooperation on matters of ·security policy <Doc. 1-931/80>, 
13 March 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LOMAS and others on 
peace and security <Doc. 1-30/81>, 
16 September 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SCHALL and others, 
on the two-part NATO decision <Doc. 1-497/81>, 
16 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EFREMIDIS and others, 
on the European Parliament's support for the Member States of the EEC in their 
endeavours for peace <Doc. 1-700/81>, 
18 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs GAIOTTI de BlASE and 
others, on balanced and controlled disarmament <Doc. 1-760/81), 
18 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs LIZIN and others, on 
peace in Europe <Doc. 1-766/81), 
18 December 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others, on 
the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva (Doc. 1-904/81) 
15 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr VAN AERSSEN, and others 
on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine (Doc. 1-784/81), 
14 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EPHREDEMIS and others on the 
second UN Special Session on Disarmament CDoc. 1-268/82>. 
At its meeting of 21-23 April 1981, the Political Affairs Committee decided to ~raw 
up a report on European Political Cooperation and European Security. 
At its meeting of 13 May 1981, Mr HAAGERUP was appointed rapporteur. 
The Political Affairs Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 
22-24 September 1982 and 3 November 1982. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole by 33 votes 
to 5 with 4 abstentions. 
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The following took part in the vote: 
Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Haagerup, first vice-chairman and rapporteur; Mr Fergusson, 
third vice-chairman; Mr Antoniozzi, Mr Balfe (deputizing for Mr Lomas>, Mr Bafbi, 
Mr Battersby <deputizing for Lord Douro>, Mr Berkhouwer, Lord Bethell, Mr Bettiza, 
Mr Deniau (deputizing for Mr Lalor>, Mr Deschamps, Mr Ephremidis, Mr Fellermaier 
(deputizing for Mr B. Friedrich), Mr Gawronski (deputizing for Mr Donnez>, 
Mr Habsburg, Mr Hansch, Mrs Hammerich,. Mr!von Hassel, Mrs van den Heuvel, Mr Jaquet, 
Mr Klepsch, Mr Kyrkos <deputizing for Mr Piquet), Mr Langes <deputizing for Mr Bournias>, 
Mrs Macciocchi (deputizing for Mr Cariglia), Mr de La Malene, Mr d'Ormesson 
(deputizing for Mr Diligent), Mr Paisley (deputizing for Mr Romualdi), Mr Pelikan 
(deputizing for Mrs Gredal>, Mr Penders, Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Price (deputizing for 
Lord O'Hagan), Mr Ripa di Meana (deputizing for Mr van Miert>, Mr Schall, Mr Schieler, 
Mr Segre, Mr J.M. Taylor <deputizing for Lady Elles), Mrs Theobald-Paoli <deputizing 
for Mr Motchane), Mr Turner (deputi~ngfor Sir James Scott-Hopkins), Mr Walter 
(deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Wawrzik (deputizing for Mrs Lenz), Mr Zagari. 
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A 
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on European Security and European Political Cooperation 
The European Parliament, 
A confident of the contribution which the Member States of the European 
Communi~y can make to international peace and stability by acting in 
unison, 
B calling for a European peace and security policy which aims at stabilizing 
East-West relations and promoting detente, a constructive North-South 
dialogue and effective crisis management, 
C recognising that questions related to European Security are not the 
exclusive concern of Member States, Dut of vital importance to all the 
signatories qf the Helsinki Final Act, 
0 gravely disturbed by the continued increase in the number of nuclear 
weapons in the world and by the vast amount of money spent on these and 
on ever more sophisticated conventional weapons, 
E associating itself with the preoccupa~ion of the- peoples of the Community 
with both European a'nd global security_ problems, 
F understanding the widespread concern with the threat of a nuclear war 
expressed by way of demonstrations, mass meetings, books, pamphlets and 
petitions, 
G whereas adequate defence measures and arms control are two sides of the 
same coin: a balanced security policy designed to prevent war and not 
merely nuclear war, 
H deploring the Lack of progress in disarmament and arms control negotiations, 
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I expressing its support for the ongoing arms control and arms reduction talks 
dealing with Intermediate Nuclear Forces <INF>, Strategic Arms Reduction 
(START), and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in the hope that they 
will ensure European and global peace and security and reduce the vast arms 
arsenal of the super-powers and others, 
J convinced that arms control negotiations between East and West are important 
for both sides, that they should take the form of a continuous process and 
that they should be aimed at mutual security based on balanced military rel-
ations at the lowest possible arms level, 
K recommending continued close consultations within European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
L having regard to the importance of measures to promote genuine trust as a pre-
requisite for and complement to balanced arms reduction in both East and West, 
M recognising that, while the European Community and its institutions have no 
explicit responsibility for defence and military security, the Parliament can 
discuss any matter that seems to it relevant, 
N realizing the impossibility of separating a large number of foreign policy issues 
of vital interest to Europe from their direct or indirect security iaplicat1ons, 
0 taking into account, that the concept of European peace and security goes beyond 
those issues which are related to military defence and embraces non-military 
aspects of security such as the furtherance of global peace and stabiltity, 
international order and the protection of world trade, 
P supporting the decision by the governments of the Ten to include questions related 
to political security in their deliberations and consultations within the context 
of European Political Cooperation, 
Q convinced that a new war in Europe is not the solution to our political problems 
and that a nuclear war would result in the destruction of European civilization, 
R concerned that in recent times there has been an increasing tendency to solve 
political problems between states using war as an instrument of policy, 
S recognising that peace is also threatened by economic crises and that worldwide 
tensions are increased when, as in Poland, the population and particularly the 
working population are denied the right to participate. in the construction of 
a free and just order, 
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T having regard to the following motions for resolutions presented by: 
Mr SCHALL and others, on behalf of the Group of European People's Party 
(Christian Democrat Group>, on European political cooperation on matters 
of security policy <Doc. 1-931/80>, 
Mr LOMAS and others, on peace and detente (Doc. 1-30/81), 
Mr SCHALL and others, on behalf of the Group of the European Peoplets Party 
<Christian Democratic Group), on the two-part NATO decision CDoc.1-497/81>, 
Mr EFREMIDIS and others, on the European Parliament's support for the Member 
States of the EEC in their endeavours for peace (Doc. 1-700/81>, 
Mrs GAIOTTI DE BlASE and others, on behalf of the Group of the European 
People's Party (CD Group), on balanced· and ~ontrolled disarmament <Doc. 1-760/~11 
Mrs LIZIN and others, on peace in Europe (Doc. 1-766/81>, 
Mr GLINNE and others, on behalf of the Socialist Group, on the USA-USSR 
disarmament negotiations in Geneva <Doc. 1-904/81>, 
Mr VAN AERSSEN and others, on behalf of the Group of the European.People's 
Party, on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Sovi~t submarine 
(Doc. 1-784/81), 
Mr EPHREMIDIS and others, on the second UN Special Session on Disarmament 
(Doc. 1-268/82), 
U having regard the report of the Political Affairs Committee <Doc. 1-946/82) 
States as its conviction that: 
1. - .The Member States of the European Community share a number of vital security 
co~cerns even if the Community has no military dimension of its own; 
2. - These shared security concerns should be fully explored and elaborated, 
particularly within the context of EPC, in order to give substance to and 
realize a true European peace and security concept and to promote the 
security of all European peoples; 
3 • - Efforts should be made to bring about a wider understanding by the public, 
political parties and governments of the many diverse elements which 
contribute to the evolving European security'concept, without infringing 
the rights and responsibilities of national governments in defence matters; 
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4. - The t:ur-opea·n Pat't iftint can ptay a sighifi t~ht rote in tsti'~ifig imout 
su-ch an tlt"M'ii"~ti'i1YH~:tSy its active iind ~rowing.particl'pati6n in 
European Pol it teal t~eration, by iCfentifyin·g ··t~nd d'ebating corriifton 
European security concerns and by arrangi-ng hearings and seminars 
on security-related issues; 
5. - As all present and .Probable Community Member States but one are ,members 
of the Atlantic Alliance, it is urged that a more effective co-ordination 
take place between the political consultations in EPC and NATO respectively; 
6. - Consultations in EPC must not negate political consultations within the 
Atlantic Alliance but should on the co~rary strengthen such consultations; 
7.- While efforts to sustain·ctose relations and intimate cooperation with 
the United States and Canada as a vital element of European security should 
be maintained and, if possible, further increased, improvements should be 
s~ught in the East-West relationship in Europe in full compliance with and 
on the basis of the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 with the aim of reducing 
existing tensions and enlarging the scope and the role played by the CSCE 
process; 
8. - Increased competition in the fields of armaments constitutes a grave threat 
to security and peace in Europe, and so the voices of the peace movements 
which have spoken out in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the USA against 
the growing arms race and the admonitions and warning coming from Christian 
churches are of great importance; 
9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission, the ten Community Member Gov~rnments and the Governments of 
s'pain and Portugal, and further to the Governments of. the United States, 
Canada, Norway, Iceland, and Tu_rkey. 
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EUROPEAN POLI~ICAL C&-OPEM~lON- AND' EUROPgAN SECORITY. 
=·===~·==•==·=•============·===·==·===========·=·===== 
Introduction. 
Why has'it been deemed useful to have a 
report on EPC and European security? It is a well-
known fact that the' ·community has no legal competence 
in the field of defence and security and that no one 
commissioner has been specifically ·a~inted for. these areas. 
The Treaty of Rome has no clauses dealing with security' 
and there has been no full-scale attempt to broaden 
the scope of the Community to include defence since 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome. 
The reason for a report dealing w.ith European 
security is manifold. European Political Co-operation, 
which·has developed rapidly over the last ten y~ars, 
puts increasing emphasis on security aspects of foreign 
policy issues. The reason for this stems not 
from a preoccupation with security issues as such, 
but from the increased tensions in the world (and not onlt · ·· 
within the traditional East/West cold war context),· thus 
the growing disorder which is noticeable in sever~l 
regions of the world have made it inevitable that 
security concerns have come to play a growing role. 
It is an indisputable fact that attempts to 
maintain or secure world order fail more often 
than they succeed and that developments in various 
parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and notably 
the Middle East, have left the impression that world 
order, insofar as it ever existed, is crumbli~g. 
A second reason for a report on European 
security is the growing interest in arms control and 
disarmament and the widespread opposition to_ any in~ 
crease of the nuclear weapons arsenals and to a further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. This interest 
arises again from the growing feeling'·'Qc- -insecurity, 
'i•"'"' 
which has to do with the increased inter6~tional ten-
sions and growing disorder, but it is also a sign of a 
certain impatience with tpe present security system 
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in Europe.,. a.l..thQ~ it has ma.naged tp. keep p&aee- in our 
continent for more than 35 years. 
Furthermore, there is undoubtedly a need to 
sort out the issues and explain the problems and terms 
used in the debate dealing with both world security 
and European security. The London repo~t of November 
1981 on European Political Co-operation made,for the 
first time,a reference to security by officia~ly ac9ept-
.ing the need to discuss the political aspects of security 
a~ong ·the Foreign Ministers of the Ten. But wher.e is the 
borderline between defence and security? One of. the 
underlying motives for this report is to make an attempt 
to differentiate between such commonly used terms as 
security, defence, arms control an~ disarm~ment. 
The emphasis will not be on the strictly 
military aspects of security, which a.re the responsibili-
ty of national governments and for the military alliance 
. -the Atlantic Alliance- to which all the Member States 
of the Community but one belong. However, secu~ity 
is a much more comprehensive concept than just a policy 
concerned with the purely military aspects of security. 
rt is a fact that some political and economic decisions 
by Member States and by the Community often have ,_ 
obvious security implications. 
Such decisions, therefore, inevitably lead 
to a more identifiable European concept of security 
d~termined by those concerns which are shared by the 
t~n Member States, irrespective of their membership 
or non-membership of the Atlantic Alliance. 
It is the task of this report to briefly 
trace these deve1opments to ascertain how and why they 
lead to a concept of European security. 
' . . 
This will also explain why the report makes no 
recommendation as to the setting-up of new institutions 
in the immediate future to deal with the vital security 
r 
concerns of the Me~er States of the CommunitY• Such 
concerns will for ~time beiD3 have to be dealt with by the Menber 
States and by the Camunity within the context of existing 
institutions, though it is obvious that the growing 
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European identity of' interests will necessarily mean 
that both governments and Community institutions may 
consider new ways of dealing with many international 
problems. 
Unlike most other reports on European security, 
this report deals primarily with the present and the 
immediate future. It is not a blueprint for how a 
future European defence community can and should look 
and it is not recommending policies and steps which 
are only realizable in a European context more advanced 
·and very different from the present Community and 
EPC structure. 
The rapporteur recognizes that the future 
may hold several options for closer European co-opera~ 
tion not only on broad security problems but also on 
specific and general defence issues. If, how and when 
they are to be brought about is beyoad the scope of 
this report, which focuses primarily on the present 
needs and current problems, insofar as European 
Political Co-Operation: and European security are 
concerned. 
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EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT. 
·===·=====·····===·================================ 
The security environment of Europe is, li5e 
the rest of the world, characterized by the e-xi-stence 
of a de&tructive pote.Jltial far superior to 
anything in history. The destructive capability of 
existing arms arsenals could conceivably do away with 
c~vilisation and kill all mankind, maybe even ten or 
twenty times over. It is a situation which is some 
times referred to as overkill capacity, which is to 
be explained by the enormous military nuclear power 
available to, above al~ the two super-powers, but also to 
thr&&. other and potentiq.lly nore nations for purposes of 
• 
war. 
It is often alleged that this overkill ~apacity 
is in itself a highly destabilizing factor, which 
could lead to outbreak of war. This is by 
no means certain. Without going to the other extreme 
and simply statingthat there is 'safety in numbers' -
a statement not wholly without truth- the staggering 
number of nuclear warheads and other destructive means 
may not proportionally increase the danger of war. 
Hpwever, they a~e certainly evidence of an enormous 
waste, because there is no agreement between the 
super-powers or, for that matter, among other nations 
as to what is enough. To define what would be enough 
to deter a future global war is a pr·incipal objective 
of the current START talks (formerly SALT). 
On the whole, the existence of nuclear weapons 
since 1945 has played an important,maybe decisive, 
role in preventing a new world war. en. the other hand, they 
have by no means contributed to a more satisfactory 
international world order. On the contrary, the 
world scene is marked by increased violence and dis-
order. There is no generally accepted international 
system of world order and security. 
.I 
The United Nations, in spite of its qlobal roombershio, has in 
no way become strong enough to form the basis of 
such a system. 
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The energence in the post-war ~ra of two , 
super-powers, which today remain by far the strongest 
powers, was the basis of the so-called sy.stem of bi-'. 
polarity. it undoubtedly lent the internation·ai 
system a certain stability. But even that element 
is gradually being.eroded. The regional security 
system in Europe continues to provide for a considerable 
I element of secur·i ty, so r-ar as the danger of open 
military conflict between East and West is concerned. 
But outside Europe it is becoming increasingly evideht 
that the super-powers· are less and less able tp influence 
events to ~ extent that they· were, say, 15-20 years ago. 
~Jars and other forms of -armed conflicts- in south-East : 
Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa; and in· t.atiii -- --· 
America testify to this development. 
As far as Western. European security is concerned 
it continues ·to be closely linked to North America and 
the United States nuclear guarantee of European security.· 
This is a state·of affairs which neither the United 
States and Canada on the one hand, nor the western 
European Member States of the Atlantic Alliance on 
the other wish to see brought to an end. However, 
the Atlantic Alliance is becoming burdened with an 
increasing number of problems, partly but not wholly 
in consequence of the economic crisis, the rising 
number of unemployed, and unsatisfactory economic 
growth. Foreign policy perceptions differ between 
Washington and European capitals, and if divergencies 
across the Atlantic.should seriously threaten the 
credibility of Atlantic cohesion it could have 
harmful and maybe fatal consequences for European security. 
Not only European economic well-being but 
also European s~curity depend on the continued access 
j. 
l 
I 
' 
to oil and .to a number of minerals. However, these are 
often to be found only in regions of potential instability 
and they will norm.ally hRve to be tr-a·nsported tO' Europe 
by way of sea lanes that would·be dangerously exposed by · 
locai conflicts and by the threat"of a wioer conflict. 
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During the last few years, popular expressions 
of opposition to nuclear weapons and indeed to a 
continued policy o£ armed defence are coming to_ play 
·an important role in a number of Western European 
countries. Irrespective of the sincere desires for peace Such llll!l'lifestatiCN -ttflect they 
cc:uld mean a serious threat to Eul'q)ean security, insofar as volatHe j:lbl ic c.piniO"t may make t ., 
it more difficult, if not impossible, one day to main-
tain an adequate defence posture. The rise of the 
peace movements and the large scale anti-nuclear weapon 
·rallies in several European cities indicate the diffi-
culties inherent in-implementing policies of nuclear 
weapons deployment or increased defence expenditure. 
This is of special significance in light of 
the so-called double decision taken by the NATO Council 
in December 1979 to deploy 572 Pershing II and Cruise 
-Missiles from 1983 onwards. The other part of the 1 
QOUble decision was ~ wi ~ the a~ of opening discussions with t:tte: 
.' I 
Soviet Union on Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons 
(INF), and it was before these negotiations were started 
! 
f 
a1 Nc:Mmtler 30, 1981, that most large scale anti-nucl~r ral~ies 
'took place in several Eu~opean cities. If the negotia- I 
-tions should fail to bring about the desired and 
hoped for result$ such rallies may occur again-and 
I 
could make it politi~alty difficult to implement the decision to 
deploy the weapons. 
Even if the Soviet Union has built enormous 
military-power durinq the last decades, there are 
I 
obvious weaknesses on the Soviet side as well. The 
( 
enormous soviet military power cannot compensate for 
·the glaring weaknesses in the Soviet system. Although 
the Soviet Union is in a relatively better positio~ as to 
' access to oil and other minerals than is Western Europe, 
the deplorable state of Soviet agriculture is one· but by m 
means the only sign of the serious gaps in Soviet 
economic development. Other gaps include a dependence 
on access to Western technology. 
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. 
Events in Poland since early 1980 are indica-
tions of another striking weakness of the Soviet posi-
tion. The whole Soviet empire has to be kept together 
by military force and strict police control. This 
would appear to make a conscious Soviet decision to 
launch a war upon Western Europe less likely. 
However, the need for continued suppression in. at least 
part of Eastern Europe and the unwillingness to allow 
organized political opposition of any kind 
may make new local explosions more and not less likely 
in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it could be one of the 
frightening scenarios for Europe that local unrest 
could spread and involve Soviet armed forces and make 
an incursion into NATO territory a temptation in order 
to distl::'aet ·attention fran the serious situation inside the borders 
of the Soviet empire. 
Threats to European security are normally 
viewed within an East/West context. However, as wars 
in 1981 and 1982 have proved repeatedly (the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Israel invasion of Lebanon, the Falkland war) 
threats to peace and international security may arise outside 
~h~ Rast/West context. European security is therefore not 
to be viewed only on the.basis of her geographical position 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but aiso in terms of-her 
P~nnomic dependence on trade and her continued free 
access to raw materials and broad internatinnRl re~pect 
folC codes of conduct: such as international law and 
multilateral and bilateral. treaties and conventions. 
Seen in this liqht, the prospects for European security 
can hardly pe considered reassuring. 
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DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE 
-------------·=-----···----~===--··=-
Whether or not one believes that armaments 
constitute tbe primary source of international conflict 
it is hardly a matter of dispute that disarmament 
and arms control - two terms frequently used inter• 
changeably - ehould be the subject of serious study 
and discussion. 
It would be erroneous to think that our 
security concerns would simply disappear as a result 
of disarmament and arms ~ontrol agreements. In fact, 
one of the things that is wrong with the often heated 
discussion is the blind faith of far too many people 
in them as panaceas leading to a peaceful world. 
One does not have to go to the other extreme 
and state that arms are only tbe symptoms of 
conflicts. The existence of arms and arms races may 
indeed create or worsen tensions and thereby increase 
the risk of open conflict. Following this line of 
reasoning, it is therefore considered an indisputable 
fact that arms control and disarmament can lead, and in 
some cases have led, to measures stabilizing relations 
between two opposing countries or groups of countries. 
tt is therefore, for the purpose of this report, 
essential to take a closer look at present and future 
arms control negotiations and agreements to assess the 
contributions they may make to European security. 
If ne particular mention is made of the role 
played by the United Nations i~ is because this role 
has = unfottunately • been rather marginal except ~hen 
the two super-pbwers have played a leading part as 
they did in the negotiations which led to the Non= 
Proliferation Agreement in 1968. 
The two special sessions of the United Nations 
devoted exclusively to disarmament may have been use• 
ful in highlighting the preoccupation of government 
leaders with disarmament problems, but they led to 
virtually nothing. The second session held in the 
Summer ~ 1982 was generally considered an outright 
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failure. 
UN sponsored disarmament negotiations continue 
to take place in the framework of the Committee on 
Disarmament (CO), which was created by the 1978 UN 
special session of disarmament to replace the Confe-
rence of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). One of 
the changes made was to increase the number of parti-
cipating countries, a procedure which in the past has 
not led to more rapid progress, but the political 
pressure for more countries to take an active part 
in the talks was too strong to resist. 
As seen from the point of view of European 
security, these UN talks are considered less important 
than the START, INF, and MBFR negotia~ions. Of these 
negotiations, the European ~ountries take part in ~he 
MBFR talks only, but European security depends as mu\.·h 
I 
if no~ more on ~ ~se and the eventual outcome of 
the START and INF negotiations between the two super-
powers. 
A mention should also be Made of the role p~yedl 
by the Conference on ~ecurity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), even if thes~ negotiations are not soley devoted : 
to security issues. However, disc!,.lssions __ on Confidence 
Building Measures CCBMs) and other security re~ated isssues 
have show~ the potential significance of the ongoing CSCE1 
process for European security, in sp.ite !?f the drsappC?inting 
results of the two f~llow-up conferences to the ori~inal 
Helsinki conference in 1975, i.e. the Belgrade Conferenc~ 
in 1977-78 and the ~ad~id Conference in 198rT82. I. 
The START talks (Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks),which.began in Geneva in June 1982, are for all 
. practical purposes th~ ?ontinuation of the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). These talks resulted 
,in the first SALT Agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in 1972, later ratified by both 
super-powers, and in the SALT II-Treaty signed in 1979. 
Unlike SALT I, the SALT II-Treaty was never ratified 
! 
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by the United States' Senate because of the deteriora-
tion in East/West relations following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the widespread reservations 
in the US about the provisions of the Treaty. 
President Reagan let it be known in 1981 
that he did not intend to ask the Senate to ratify 
the SALT II Treaty as he shared the misgivings about 
its provisions. However, both super-powers are apparent 
ly adhering to the provisions of the Treaty, pending 
the outcome of the START talks begun in June 1982. 
The new acronym START ~ather than SALT is used to 
underline the new US emphasis on reduction rather than 
just limitation of the nuclear arsena~s. This is in 
line with President Reagan's proposal for a new agree-
ment on strategic arms, which would lead to considerable 
cuts in the present strategic armoury of the two super-
powers. 
The INF talks which started in late 1981, deal 
with Internediate Range Nuclear Forces (hence the term INF) in 
Eurcp!. 'lhey oonprise~ ..al:x>ve all, the so-called ss- 20" missiles 
which the Soviet Union started to deploy in the mid-
1970's, and the planned 572 Pershing II and Cruis_e 
Missiles which the NATO countries have decided to 
deploy from 1983-84 onwards, unless the talks wi~ 
the Soviet Union on It-."'F are succes-sful. 
The Western negotiating position as outlined by P~esi­
dent Reagan is one of the so-called 'zero-option•, 
implying that the West will not deploy the·Pershifig II 
and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet 
Union agrees to cancel all its SS 20 missiles and 
·'. 
the smaller SS 4 and SS 5 Missiles which are older and 
much l~ss sophisticated versions of the highly mobile 
SS 20 Missiles. 
The· Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
were earlier called TNF (Theatre Nuclear F.orces) and 
they are sometimes referred to as· tii-e-I.:i~TNF--(i~~g----- - -- ·-
Range Theatre Nuclear Forces), a term used to 
differentiate these medium range missiles from the 
intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed in 
the Soviet Union and in the United States or 
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on nuclear submarines on the one hand, and from 
tactical nuclear weapons to be used as battlefield 
weapons on the other hand. 
The MBFR talks started in 1973 as a sort of 
military corollary to the CSCE process. The pa·r tic ipa t-
ing countries include all warsaw Pact countries and 
most NATO countries, notably minus France. They deal 
with proposals to reduce the number of army and air 
force personnel in a precisely defined area in Central 
Europe. 
After more than 9 years of negotiations the 
talks have produced no results, mainly because the two 
ppposing parties have been unable to agree on the actual 
force levels on both sides~ the Soviet Union insisting 
that the Warsaw Pact forces are at least 150.000 men 
smaller than postulated by the NATO countries. The -
East bas claimed that there is a relative balance of 
forces in Europe,-whereas-the West has always claimed 
that there is a disparity amounting to more than 
150.000 ground force personnel in favour of the East. 
The declared Western a~m is therefore to eliminate 
this disparity in order to enhance stability in Central 
Europe. 
When the talks were resumed on 8th July,1982,thel 
NATO countries tabled a draft treaty proposing that 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact agree to a common collective 
ceiling of 900.000 ground and air force personnel for 
~ach alliance, the ground forces to represent no more 
than 700.000 of these. Whereas no immediate Soviet 
reaction was iorthcoming, it was pointed out by a 
Soviet spokesman that the West ~ad made no effort to 
estimate the numbers of forces 9urrently deployed. 
Although both the negotiations on START and. INF are bilateral 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, both are of direct iAterest 
to the Europeans. 
The ·Europeans have been closely involved_ i~ the evolution of the 
INF negotiating position submitted by the Americans in Geneva and the· US 
consults closely with its European allies on all aspects of the negotiations 
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through a Speci~l Consultative Group (SCG). The United States also 
informs its Allies on a regular basis of developments in the START · 
negoti~tions. 
By late autumn 1982, no progress had been 
reported on the INF talks, and sov1et statements .by. amnog :others, 
President Bresjnev in November 1982 indicated a hardening:of the 
Soviet position. The European NATO countries have warmly welcomed 
Pres identReagin I s--:-p-ropo-sal -for a·· zeio=opfion ~- ·a:-pyo---
posal which was seen by some commentators as a conces-
sion to European pressuresl which were, in part, due to 
the widespread demonstrations ag·a,inst the planned deployment 
of American medium range missiles. It was also seen as a 
·response·to the rise of peace movements not only in several 
Western European countries but also in the United States. 
As far as the CSCE · process is concer-ned, the 
disappointing outcome of the Madrid conference .in the 
spring of 1982 was due to the new·and colder climate 
in East/West relations and not. to any reduced European 
interest in detente, arms control and confidence 
building measures. The proposal tabled by France to 
hold a Buropean disarmament conference has not been 
ab.andoned and has in fact· won general support. The 
holding of this conference and the prospects for it 
achieving concrete results obviously depend on the 
development of East/West relations,'including develop-
ments in Afghanistan and, in particular, in Poland. 
A further extension of the confidence building 
measures such as pre-notification of military manoeuvres 
and exchange of military observers will also have to 
await new developments in East/West relations in Europe. 
When the Madrid Conference resumed on 9 November 1982, 
the prospects for a successful outcome had hardly improved. 
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FROM EDC (EUROPEAN DEF~CE COMMUNITY) TO EPC 
(EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION~. » • 
==================================·========= 
It is a source of great concern to some and 
a source of great relief to others that the European 
Community is an economic and political entity without 
a military dimension. That this is so in no way 
means that Western Europe has neglected its defence. 
However, the task of providing for the defence of 
Wes·tern Europe has been entrusted to the national 
governments of the Western European countries and, in the 
case of most Western European countries, in close 
·co-operation with the United States and canada within 
the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is not 
disputed that military defence falls outside the scope of 
responsibility of the European ·community. 
Throughout the history of the European C~mmu-
nity, it hurepeatedly been discussed if and when a 
mili~y dimension could and should be added to the 
ecooomlc and political dimensions. Wi.thout going into 
the already long history of the European unification 
movement and of the European Community, it should be 
recalled that p~ans for the. European Defence _Community preceded 
the European· community and that the saiq Defence Commun-
ity never got off the ground. In fact, ·the present Fllrcpean 
Community may partly owe its existence to the c·oLl~pse of the 
planned.European Defence Community in 1954. 
Two motives were behind the EDC Treaty in the 
early 1950's. One was to inco~porate a German military 
contribution to the defence of Western Europe, thereby 
avoiding the creation of a new German army and a national 
general staff. The othe~ motive was to bring about 
a short-cut to the creation of a European political 
union without which a common defence was not conceivable 
The two had to go together. That was as tru~ then as it 
is true today. 
The refusal of the United Kingdom to join the 
EDC and the non-ratification by the French National 
Assembly in August 1954 effectively blocked the crea-
tion of a true.ly united political European entity with 
its own integrated defence. The means by which the 
- 21 - PE 80.082/fin. 
·-·-·- _ .._ .. _~------ --· --- -----· -----
desir.able objective of uniting Europe should be brought 
about would have to be realized in other ways - if at all. 
This has not stopped the discussion as to how a 
close European defence cooperation could be brought about. 
25 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the 
Community may not have moved closer to the establishment 
of a separate European defence capability, but Europeans 
are as preoccupied with security issues as ever. This 
preoccupation is by no means exclusively focused on the 
needs to bring about a specific European defence entity, 
which is a ·very controversial subject in several Community 
Member States. It rather takes the form of advocating an 
active policy of detente, in some cases amounting to a 
policy of equi-distance for Western Europe vis-a-vis the 
two super-powers. Others, however, see a need to 
strengthen both the conventional and the nuclear defence 
of Western Europe. This explains the European support for 
the decision in 1978 to increase defence expenditures in 
NATO by 3 per cent annually in real terms, (althouqh the 
decision was never implemented in full) and the double 
decision in December 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Cruise 
Missiles from 1983 onwards and to start arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
--- There-rB no ag-r-eement on the ·consequences of 
Western Europe having no defence capability of its 
own. In a booklet in 1981 written by the directors 
of four Western foreign policy institutes, it was 
stated, 'So far, despite the existence of two nuclear 
powers in Western Europe and of a strong German conven-
tional army, the Europeans have not been willing or 
able since 1954 to move towards a more independent 
European defence posture. This failure has inhibited 
Europe's ability to play a more significant role in 
world affairs. ' 
This may or may not be true. It cannot be 
stated with any certainty that western European in-
fluence in world affairs depends on the ability of 
the Community to project military power in other parts 
of the world. It may even be alleged that the civilian 
status of the Community may make it somewhat more 
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attractive as an active partner to several countries 
of the Third World, as they view with considerable 
distrust the awesome military capabilities and possible 
intentions of the two competing super-powers. 
On the other hand, it can hardly be disputed 
that if European integration ;s·to continue, and if 
European Political Co-Operation is to grow significantly 
over the next s-10 years, then the oamon security concerns 
of the ten, soon to be twelve, Member States of the 
·Community will become more easily identifiable and 
reinforce the discussion'of a new institutional 
approach to European defence. 
However, a quick look at the existing institutions 
dealing with European deferice tasks and preoccupations 
does not appear to make it more likely that the Europ-
ean Community is about to develop its own military 
dimension. 
The Western European Union as it exists today 
on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1955 
may be regarded by many as obsolescent and a relic of 
the past •. However, it is worth recalling that article 
V of the Brussels Treaty lays down the nature of the 
commitment entered into by its signatories for their 
collective security. Article VIII, defines the foreign 
policy and defence implications of this undertaking. 
The WEU continues to play an arms control role, 
even if some of the original 1955 provisions have been 
modified. Furthermore, the Assembly of Western European· · 
Union continues to devote considerable time and work 
to defence issues, which are the proper responsibilities 
of the Assembly, and regularly adopts recommendations 
in the field of defence. 
The present French Government has more than 
once made references to the existence of the Western 
European Union as the proper forum for a debate on . 
European defence. 
The reports adopted and puolishedoy-t]1e western 
European Union on a number of defence issues are generally of 
a high quality, and some of them have been used as backqround 
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for this report. 
However, the Western European Union cannot 
be considered the natural vehicle for creating a closer 
Western European defence co-operation ·nor for 
adding a military dimension to the European 
Community. This is due to its limited membership, to 
the general lack of interest even among se.veral of the 
member governments, and to the improbability of EEC 
countries like Ireland, Denmark, and Greece joining 
the Western European Union. It would be unfortunate 
if some kind of rivalry should develop between the 
Western European Assembly and the European Parliament 
or, for that matter, between the Western European 
Union and the European Community as to which institu-
tion should be the focal point for a future European 
security policy. One way to avoid this ~s to keep in 
mind .the difference between the military aspects of 
security, which are properly being discussed and dealt 
with by the Western European Union, and the broader 
issu·es of security, which will increasingly play a 
role in the European Community. 
Two other institutions while making useful 
tiohs to Western European defence cannot be con-
sidered adequate as a wider framework for a closer 
co-operation on defence among the te~ Member States 
of the European Community. One is the Euro-Group, 
which was created in 1968, comprising the European 
Member States of the Atlantic Alliance except France. 
The primary task of Euro-Group remains the improvement 
of the defence capabilities of NATO in Europe. The 
Euro-Group activities are divided among seven 
sub-groups 1>. The Euro-Group is closely associated 
with NATO, and an additional task undertaken by the 
l) The seven groups are: Euro-:Can, Euro-Nad,· Eur0-Longte:rm, 
Euro-Med, Euro-Log, Euro/NATO-Training and 
Euro-Structure 
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Euro-Group has been an active information policy 
to give public opinion, particularly in the 
United States, a better knowledge of the extent and 
nature of the contribution of Euto-Group countries 
to the Alliance's defence. 
The Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG), which was founded in February 1976 with the 
aim ot furthering European co-operation in the defence 
equipment field, consists of all European member state~ 
in NATO with the exception of Iceland. The participa-
tion of France has enabled the IEPG to become gradually 
the pivotal ~uropean organization in the field of 
defence procurement. This means that nine of the· ten 
present Member States of the Community take part in 
IEPG, the major objective of which is to create the 
basis ·for a more equitable Europ~an co-pperation with 
the United States and Canada inproduction and procure~ 
. . ' 
ment in the defence equipment tield. 
There is no formal link between NATO and 
IEPG, a factor that has made it possible for Prance 
to take part in the work. However, the actual progre•• 
of IEPG has been rather limited and,in the ~ords of 
one of its active participants,"there has so far been 
more promise than delivery~ The IEPG is not linked 
to the Community in any way, but the work of the IEPG. 
would certainly have to be taken into consideration . · 
.if further progress is to be achieved within the Com-· 
munity to co-ordinate arms procurement, arms producti~n, 
and.arms sales as proposed tirst in the 1978 Klepsch 
report and in the forthcoming Fergusson report~) 
Several suggestions have been made in· the 
past to co-ordinate the British and the French nuclear 
forces, and there has even been some talk of Franco-
German nuclear co-operation. For several reasons. 
these proposals have never been realized an~ are unlikel~· 
to be realized under the present circumstances. Under 
the prevailing strategic conditions, Western Europe 
seems highly unlikely to be able to develop a credible 
dete~rent of its own. It would require a much.closer . 
{ 1 ) See also the report by David Greem.lood of late 1980 to the camrl.ssion 
of the ·Eur~ Ccmnunities on a policy for praooting defence and 
technological cooperation anong West European countries 
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4 political integration than is the case today. 
An institutionalized approach to setting-up a 
distinct European defence entity seems therefore, for 
the time being, to be out of the question, without 
even considering whether or not this would be desirable. 
This leaves European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
which despite its lack of institutional machinery -
or maybe even because of it - is more likely to play 
an ever increasing role in the developing European 
security concept. Whether or not this will lead to 
the establishment of a military, dimension for the 
Community is for the future to tell. 
I, 
! . 
I. 
! . 
I 
. i 
I 
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EPC VERSUS NATO CONSULTATIONS. 
==··=======·==·=====·=··====== 
. Ever since the onset of the cold war Western European _ 
security has been closely linked to and, in fact, depend 
upon North America, and the United States continues 
to play a crucial role in European security. The signing 
of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949,comprising 
nine of the ten present Community Member States and 
the setting-up of NATO,comprising eight of the Community 
Member· States, was tantamount to the creation of a multi-
lateral and institutional framework for the United States'. 
military presence in Europe to carry out the United 
States' guarantee against potential ?oviet agr~ssion. 
Significant changes in the Atlantic relation-
ship could therefore have a far-reaching impact upon 
European security. This is not the place to review all 
the arvergencies i:>etween- -th-e uiiifeci-st.ates ·an-c1--we&t-ern 
Europe. In any discussion .of the crisis in NATO-. 
as it is some times called - it should be recalled that 
many such crises have occurred in the 33 year old history 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Atlantic divergencies have been reflected in 
different assessments of the Soviet menace and in the 
conduct of detente policy. In the early 1980's, import-
ant economic issues have come to the fore. The dispute 
over steel exports from the Community to the United 
·states and over agricultural policies is to be seen again~ 
tne background of. the drawn ou~ e_cono .. !.{c_~.r'isJ~ _in the industrialised world. 
Following the decision by the United States' Government in June 1982 
to apply sanctions against US carpanies in :E\lrq)e or E\lrq;)ean carpanies 
working on US licenses to delay or to prevent the much discussed natural 
gas project fran the Soviet Union to a nurrber of Western European 
countries, ~et ~nother element has been added to strain the relationship 
- between the United States and the Community. 
Even if the disagreements are mainly outside 
the field of security, European- American disputes over 
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vital economic matters could lead to troubles for the 
Atlantic Alliance because the mutual perceptions of 
the Atlantic relationship would inevitably be affected 
by disputes which have their origin in different economic 
policies and in two distinctly different views as to 
the proper policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
For the purpose of this report one particular 
aspect needs closer examination insofar as it has a 
bearing on the political aspect of the Atlantic rela-
tionship. This concerns the evolution of EPC and the 
relationship between political consultations in EPC 
and the political consultations which are taking place 
in the NATO Council among the NATO Ambassadors and 
their principal aidea. 
During the past 10 years, EPC has come to 
play an ever increasing role in identifying and pursuing 
common European interests.!) It was pointed out by the 
then six Member States, as far back as 1970 that, 
security concerns were not to be explicitly excluded 
from the foreign policy deliberations amang the Community 
Member States. In fact, security issues as such· were · 
only rarely disc.ussed and military problems never. 
However, the co-operation among the nine.Member States 
during the preparatory and later phases of the Conference 
on Security and Co-Operation in Europe did bring in 
a number of security issues, even if it almost happened 
by a backdoor. The CSCE process has been less dominated 
by security problems than might appear from the term 
itself. But a practice developed according to which the 
EEC States co-ordinated their views amongst them-
selves before they were taken up in the NATO Council, 
sometimes including issues that certainly bordered on 
security such as the Confidence Building Measures be-
tween East and West in Europe and the holding of a dis-
armament conference in Europe on the basis of the French 
proposal. By and large, this practice was deemed useful 
by all countries concerned including those NATO countries 
1) For a history.of EPC and the Parliament's recommenda-
tions for further development of EPC, see the report 
by Lady Elles, adopted by the European Parliament 
on July 9, 1981 (Doc.No.1-335/81) 
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which were not and are not members of the Community. 
The.expansion of EPC involving a growing 
·' 
number of officials from the Foreign Ministries of the 
now ten Member States, the frequent participation by 
the Political Directors and the discussion of foreign 
policy issue~ not only ~mong the Foreign Ministers of 
the Ten but even in the European Council1have come 
to mean that EPC is having a policy~making role with 
. \ obvious implications for the consultations conducted with-
in NATO. 
~I 
Contrary to the belief of some, this is not 
due to the Ten deliberately making inroads on security 
issues which have been the principal themes constantly 
under review in the NATO Council. Mili~ary/security 
issues. continue to be avoided in the EPC, but the latest 
report on EPC - the London report adopted in Oct()ber 1981 
during the UK presidency - recognized for the first 
time that security issues have a place in EPC. 
This was stated in the passage of the report 
which reads, 'As regards the scope of EPC and having 
regard to the different situations of the Member States, 
the Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible 
and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to 
discuss in political co•op~ration certain important 
foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects 
of security.' 
EPC de.liberations on security are limited 
on the one hand by the participation of the Republic 
of Ireland, which adheres to a policy of neutrality. 
This Irish neutrality is to be viewed in a historical 
context.and ther.fore to be seen especially in the light 
of the .sometimes stra~ relationship with the United 
Kingdom. It has not prevented Ireland from taking full 
part in EPC, althougl;l .tbe need to maintain Irish neutra-
lity was given as the official explanation for Ireland's 
position during the latter phase of the Falkland con-
flict in 1982. The other constraint on EPC delibera-
tions on security stemmed from the si~le fact that 
vital security issuea, including military as well as 
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non-military aspects of security, are being dealt with 
in a forum involving both the United States and Canada 
and those European states which are_members of NATO 
but not of the European Community, sue~ as Norway, 
Turkey, Iceland, and - for a brief while yet -
Spain and Portugal. 
The growing scope and the increasing signifi-
, . 
cance of EPC consultations have indisputedly downgraded 
to some eXtent the NATO consultations. This is in part also 
due to the way E~C.consultations are being prepared and 
carried out by the Foreign Ministries of the Ten in ever 
closer co-operation. This has the effect of sometimes 
pre-empting NATO consultations, which are not and cannot 
be limited to strictly military aspects of security. 
The difference is, holever, that security deli-
berations in NATO are always to be seen against the back-
ground of the role played by the armed forces of the 
Member States -of the Alliance in deterring aggression 
and promoting detente, whereas EPC scrupulously avoids 
discussing military issues for a variety ~f reasons. 
No formal liaison exists between EPC and NATO and in Brussels 
there are generally no lines of communication between.EEC officials 
of the Commission and ~he Council, including those 
working on-political problems, and NATO officials. 
The modus operandi of NA~ and EPC is quite 
different. The Foreign Ministers meet twice a year 
in the NATO Council, whereas the day-to-day work is 
being carried out by the permanent representatives 
and their staffs. over the _years they have established 
almost a club-like atmosphere in which policy recommenda-
tions and deci$ions are being tak~n on a number of poli-
tical and political/military issues with'tbe ever-present 
aim of maintaining an effective deterrent posture. 
Within EPC, the Foreign Ministers meet more 
frequently. So do the Political Directors and several 
other officials, who form a number of specialized work-
ing groups. Because of the frequency of these meetings 
on several levels and the continuous-co-ordination of 
views by way of the electronic links that con·nect all 
Foreign Ministries of the Ten, the EPC process manages 
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to influence national decision•ma~ing at an early 
stage- up to and including meetings of ··Foreign Ministers· 
and Heads of Government. 
Procedures rather than thetftes ar·e· th'erefo.re 
one reason why the EPC proeesa·ma1 appear to play ~ 
more crucial role in actual deciaon-making. 
There is also an inherent atttactiontor EPC, 
- . .. . . . .. 
because it ~a a r-elatively new phenomenon, and it forJDS . 
part of a European unificatiowprocess that may .have 
lost much of its·drive and publ-ic appeal, at least as 
far as many aspects of Community policies are concerned. 
But EPC has for that very reason an appeal-of its own 
because it does give the impression of a Europe on the 
move. cynics may add that it is'easier to agree on 
lofty statements of-principle and declarations of intent, 
such as the Venice Declaration on the Middle Ea~t, than 
it is to agree on policies which entail financial co~ 
. " . ," 
mitments or political obligations which may hurt at 
home. lt is politically more attractive - and sometimes easier -
. . 
to make it, look as if the ComiiiUnity is actively involved ~n 
• 1 
solving the problems of the Middle East than to re•ch 
an agreement.on .a fisheries policy. 
It may ·also be a fact that political securi-
ty issues which are being dealt with in EPC are consider-
ed so much more appealing than military/security issues, 
especially when the latter involve expenditures an~ maybe-
politically controversial commitments such as the_com-
mitment to deploy nuclear weapons,:· In El>C, the talks 
focus _,re, ':~n CSCB, confidence building and even diaar-
mar~.an~. 
. ~t goes alaos·t without saying that it could 
prove politically diaruptive of tb• Atlantic relation-
ship. if the Europe•na were left -to consider the less · 
controversial and politically more attractive iasue.s 
within ttl_. context of the EPC, · ev·en including disarma-
ment and arms control, whereaS the more contJ,OVersial 
issue_a were left. to NA'l'O. Such a division of la.bour· 
does not, of course# exist· 'but the impression ~in~ 
that it ·is nevertheless so. .. 
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The difficufties arise out of the historical 
fact that NATO consulta~lons an~ ~ approaph security _ 
issues from opposite sides. It therefore needs pointing 
out that if,BPC should ever become more closely involved 
in drawing_~p arms control schemes and disarmament 
~ : • • f 
plans, it-i~.an absolute neeeseity that E~C tackle the 
problems Qf which arms to control· and which armaments 
to __ reduce~ I_!_ th~~-.'!!~! ___ to hap~!L_it wou~d-~ unavoid-
. -
able that EPC should.deal with the strictly military aspe~ti 
of security, i.e. defence, although that is a~athema 
i 
I 1 . 
I 
. 
\ to_ some political parties and governments in the_ ~ommunity· 
.- and probablrY unwelcome to NATO countries outside the 
·community. It· would be sheer hypocrisy, however, to Let 
' ; -
the· public . .g~tin. th.e- i.mpression t.hat .. E.JH::. .. ~-cdul.d ... render 
worthwhile contributions to the ongoing debate on arms 
CQntrol and disar~ent without going intO the more 
di·fficult area o( arms deplbyment, ·force levels and· 
' ~ ' .  . 
other defence related topics. , · 
Rather than keeping .. away ·from, such topics 
it might be advisable.for EPC to· taqkle them, as 
this·may have' salutary effect upan t~ose ·who think 
there is a ·abort ~ut ~o a more con,for·table level of" 
national and international security by concentrating 
on arms cOntrol without t•king intb·account·the role 
played by 'armed ~~rces 1 on both sides in Europe1 to main-
tain a balance of power. 
There is little doubt that the ·cont.,n.uing EPC 
. . . 
process presents proble•a, 'apecially'in relation to· 
the United States. Any U$ Government is usually finding 
itself· in _the diffi.cult role of being criticized it it 
exercises forceful leadership, out or oeing equally 
criticized if Jt avoids exerci-sing any leaclerahip at 
all. European at~~ tudes vis-a-vis the· presidenci4:as of 
·Mr. Carter and Mr. Reag·an. are ca••• in pc)int. However,. 
a certain frustration on the part of-the united States 
is sometimes fel-t in. Washington, when ··the adrdniatra·tion 
is confronted with an EPC process whose agen4a·it may 
be unaware of and whose ~esults may. ptove emtsarraasi''nCJf 
as seen ftom an· ~e.ri~an poJ.m: of view; for lat*r con- ..... 
aultatio~a in NA'l'O·. 
. 1 
i 
. I 
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE • 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
·There have been nuclear weapons in Europe 
for almost 30 years. The first were so..:called tactical 
nuclear weapons sent to the us forces in Europe in the 
early '50s following a NATO decision and made avaflable 
to certain other NATO forces in Europe under the so-
ca~led double key system. The number of nucl~a~ warheads 
supplied by _t~~ Uni~~d States and stationed in Western 
Europe was for many years semi-officially given to be 
about 7.000. 
After NATO's decision in December 1979 to 
·, deploy medium range missiles from 1983, it was decided 
to withdraw 1.000 US warheads, a decision that was 
implemented by Decembe~ 1980. 
Other nuclear weapons in Europe on the Western 
side include of course the French and British nuclear 
forces. 
The debate on nuclear 
weapons reached new heights in the early 1980's as a 
result of the so-called double decision by NATO in 
· December 1979, which was again preceded by the deploy-
ment of the Soviet SS 20 missiles each equipped with 
' 
three separately guided warheads. By tate 1982 the 
number of soviet ss· 20 missiles exceed~ .320. 
With very detailed information on nuclear 
weapon' deployment in Europe available elsewhere1>, it 
·is beyond the scope of this report to give a 
breakdown of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe 
anCi ~:heir classifications and of tile different assess-
1> AIOOng the RDSt recent Plbl icatims m rue lear weapons in Europe, the 
r8RJC)rteur has fa.rd particularly useful the report to the Assen'bly 
of Western Eurq:ll!al'llklicn 'The Prci)lem of ~lear Wl!aptns in Europe' 
~ Mr. fibnnersteeg, W'lo is also a iili!ii6ef' Of the European Parl ianent, 
the Adelphi Paper tt>. 168m 'rtK:lear weapalS in Eu~' by G~ 
Trevertm, who was me of the experts who acttressedt Political 
Affairs' Conmittee of the Europecn Parliament in Decenter 1981 in l..aldon, 
cn:l the Han:t100k 'ttJClear Forces In Europe' by H.J. Neunan. The last 
two pt.bl icatims are issued by the intematia1al Institute for Strategic 
Stldies in l..c:ntln. They are all inclu:led in the bibliography. 
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It is a development which places a consider-
able burden upon the political tact and diplomacy of 
th~ presiding country among the Ten. It would be both 
unrealistic and undesirable to try to put a brake on 
the expanding EPC process. It is part of the uneven 
and sometimes slightly disorganized development towards 
the elusive objective of a distinct European identity 
t9wards which the United States has always pro(essed 
its sympathy. 
It may be an additional obstacle for fuliy 
appreciating EPC that it sometim~s·appears_from the out-
side , to be in a much more-advanced stage than it 
·really is. It is also true that the legal distinction· 
. between external relations decided on a Community 
basis in the economic field and political decisions 
taken within the context of EPC are not comprehended 
by the outsi4e world, which often fails to notice 
which hats Foreign Ministers of the Ten are wearing. 
' 
' 
,_ 
I 
I 
I' 
I 
I 
I • 
' L 
'' 
i: 
I 
I 
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ments of the current-military balance. 
Three basic Dbservations are required before 
going into the very significant role played by nuclear 
weapons both in the present military calculations on 
both sides and in the public debate in most Community 
Member States: 
- The large scale demonstrations in favour of 
.'banning the bomb' and several statements by leading 
politicians and other leading figures in Western Europe 
notwithstanding, it must be stated categorically 
that nuclear weapons cannot be totally abolished if 
for no· other reasons .than becauS'e ·--we cannot ol:ii terate 
the knowledge of how to make them. 
- There is therefore no conceivable policy providin~ 
an absolute guarantee that a nuclear war will not break 
out or that nuclear weapons will never be used. It is 
a matter of choosing between policies which. entail 
different degrees of risk. 
- Nuclear weapons cannot and should not be 
viewed simply as a new kind of more powerful weapons. 
In view of the enormous destruction that would follow 
even a limited nuclear exchange, the role of nuclear 
·weapons can only be properly evaluated on the basis 
of their function.as a war deterrent. 
The cost ofthe research and developments which have 
led to the present sophistication of the weapons held in 
the huge nuclear ·arsenals of the two super-powers 
has been very large indeed. However, 
the controversy sur_rounding nuclear weapons and the 
widespread opposition to their deployment have very 
little to do with how much they cost. In fact, com-
pared with highly sophisticated modern weaponry of a 
conventional nature, severa-l types- of nuclear weapons are today co.mpara-
tively inexpensive. The actual price in terms of ·money 
for acquiring nuclear weapons plays only a minor role 
in the efforts to prevent a further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
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Nuclear weapons came to Europe in order to 1 i 
offset the quantitative Soviet preponderance in con- i i 
ventional forces in Europe. This preponderance has ~~· 
continued to exist and is generally believed to have grown mre \ 
pronounced during the 1970's, especially as the quali- ·I 
I I 
tative lead by NATO vis-a-vis the War~aw Pact has now , 
been mainly eroded. Ev.en more significant has been 
the development in the Soviet arsenal of strategic 
nuclear weapons, which by the mid-seventies resulted 
in what is n~w considered-parity in terms of strategic wtapons between 
the two superpowers. At present";: the 'Soyie.t. 'Union .. holds a·.clear 
·. lead in the number of weapon launchers and in total 
megatonnage, whereas the United States still has a 
lead in the. total number of warheads. 
It should be added that this is the prevail-
ing Western view on the balance of forces between Bast 
and West. The Soviet view is different • 
. The Soviet Union maintains that there is a rough balance 
in all categories of weapons and forces, even if there 
are certain asynmetries in a nlJid:)er of weapon categories.· '!he 
Soviet Union does not deny, however, that. the overall 
global balance of forces has changed. The official 
Soviet expression is that the •correlation of forces• 
has been considerably improved and that the •socialist 
camp • has grown strooger. . , ; 
• . f I 
~ It is therefore to be assumed that the Soviet Union accep~s· 
that a·~tate of nuetear parity rough., exists betWeen the Soviet Uni4n 
·~nd the United· States •. Thi_s· _was so-to-speak codified by. the 
SALT I Agreement in 1972, the most important part of 
which was net the ceiling agreed on for offensive 
strategic weapons, but the virtual outlawing of missile 
defence systems (the Anti Ballistic·MissilesTreat~ 
excep-t-•:f.or the protection of one limited area only.-. 
The provisions of SALT I are still in force, 
·although new technological developments have led to 
a renewed discussion in the United States as to the 
desirability of building an ABM system. 
' 
·I 
I 
! 
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The abolition of ABM systems gave credence 
to the widely accepted notion or doctrine of 'Mutually 
Assur~d Destruc~on•, sometimes referred to as MAO. 
This doctrine is based 
on the capacity and the intention to retaliate in kind. 
Insofar as the notion of MAO can be considered 
a ~ilitary doctrine at all, it is flawed. 
Its credibility in preventing nuclear war presupposes 
not only an element of stability in the relations 
between _the ·two super-powers but also in the political 
situation within the two countries and the absence of 
serious crises in the world, which might upset the 
bilateral super-power relationship. 
In view of the strategic parity, the credibi-
lity of the United States nuclear guarantee has also 
been questioned by many, as it was by de Gaulle already 
in the mid-1960's, when the French President withdrew 
France from the integrated and US dominated defenc~ 
system in NATO. 
The debate has for many years ~~ntered roun~ 
the question of whethe~ the United States' President would be 
willing to retaliate in kind in case of a Soviet nuclear 
aggression against Western Europe or part of Western 
Eu-rope --or to use nuclear weapo~s .agai~st a conventional Soviet 
attack. Would the US President be willing to risk the destruction 
of Washington, Boston and .Pittsburg for attacks on Hamburg, Portsmouth 
and Bologna? Such questfons and other points raised in the nuclear 
debate may not take fully into account the complexities and the 
imcertainty which are parts of the deterrent theory. The 
counterargument says that the Soviet Unionis eff~vely 
deterxed not by any certainty of the United States 
response to an aggression but by the uncertainty as 
to how and where a riposte will in fact ge made. 
There is, in other words, a considerable 
element of ambiguity in the nuclear equation between 
East and West. The important feature is, however, . 
that the situation is changing all the time and it 
is indi.sputable that the Western preponderance1 on which 
NATO strategy was based for several years,has given 
way to a situation marked by parity on the strategic 
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level and continued-Soviet preponderance insofar as 
conventional forces are concerned. The latest element 
is the Soviet build-up of what is called by strategists 
Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF), mainly 
the deployment of the ss 20 missiles. 
Following a speech by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
in London in 1977, the NATO countries started to con-
sider the best way of dealing with what was. viewed as 
.. an additional threat to the West and, in particular, 
to Western Europe -deliberations which led to the al-
ready frequently mentioned NATO double decision in 
December 1979. 
This is the basis for the· current controversy 
over nuclear weapons. It is remarkable to note that 
the existence of several thousand nuclear warheads in 
Western Europe and a similar or PoSSibly smaller number 
of nuclear weapons in the East never gave rise to a 
debate of the kind which Europe· has experienced during 
the past 18 months. Debates were e-a'rlier provoked .~w-hen 
the deployment of enhanced ra:d i at ion weap6ns ._ the -so.-C..a l(ed 
n~tron bomb -"~was 'ciisc-ussed.· That plan 'gave ·ri.ie .to 
cross-Atlantic misunderstandings and to President 
Carter shelving the production of the · 
weapon, though President Reagan later decided to 
produce it without making its possible deployment 
in Western Europe an issue. 
The medium range missiles with nuclear warheads 
now commonly referred to as INF (Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces) have come to epitomize the very heated 
nuclear debate and have created political difficulties 
in some Western European countries as far as the deploy-
ment of these weapons is concerned. Opposition to the 
deployment has been voiced within the German Social DeJoocratic 
Party and the SPD's former coalition partner, the FDP. 
8oth the .previ.ous and -pr.ese.nt Ge-rman governments have 
refused to modify the German acceptance of the NATO 
decision in 1979, which was, by definition, a unanimous 
~ 
decision. Since then the Belgian government has ..bAa- to make its 
- 38 - PE 80.082/fin. 
1 
2 
position on the deployment issue explicitly dependent 
upon the outcome of the INF talks started on 30th No-
vember 1981. 
The si tuat.~on in the Netherlands is also uncertain 
after th~ former centre~lett government decided on an open-ended 
postponement of the decision on whether to station the. 
planned 48 Cruise Missiles on Dutch territory. 1· · 
Whereas the resumption of the INF talks in 
late 1981 has had a somewhat calming effect upon the 
groups in Western Europe, which took to the streets 
earlier on in protest against the decision to deploy 
medium range missiles in Western Europe, the political 
unrest and demonstrations could very well return if 
the INF negotiations have not made real progress by 
the summer of 1983. The deployment of the 572 missiles 
in Western Europe is scheduled to start in the autumn 
of 1983 and to be completed by 1988.2 
Whereas the first round of INF talks until · 
March 30, 1982 was described as businesslike, no progress 
was noted. The Soviet 'position differs markedly from 
the Western position. In the Soviet.calculation of the 
INF balance, a number of US weapo~ systems-consisting 
primarily of fighter bombers in Western Europe plu• the 
French and British nuclear forces, is included so as to 
make a rough balance. The Soviet position that a balance 
already exists is also explained by a reference to the 
partial removal of the obsolescent ss 4 and SS 5 missiles 
which have been replaced by ss 20 missiles during the 
past five years. The United States position in favour 
I 
of a zero solution - which has been accepted by all 
NATO countries - has been criticized by the Soviet. 
Union as favouring NATO. 
Whatever one's assessment of the current 
balance of forces and the prospects for the INF talks 
The same l"l..lter - 48 Cruise Missiles - is envisaged to be deployed at Belgian territory. 
The U1ited Kingjan has cannitted itself to deploying 160 Cruise Missiles, Italy 112 Cruise 
Missiles, and the Federal Rept.bl ic of Germany 96 Cruise Missiles + 1CE Pershing II Missiles. 
The latter are interO!d to replace the 108 Short Range Pershing I Missiles. 
The missiles - if deployed - will not be deployed in all 5 cantries at the sane time. It 
is envisaged that the depl0)1llel'lt will begin in the U< by the end of 1983 and catSiderably 
later in Belgium and Holland. 
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there is little doubt that the British and, in particular, 
the French nuclear forces are playing an important role 
in both military and arms control calculations. France 
refuses to let French nuclear forces be counted as part 
of the NATO .. forces. France is not taking part in the 
NATO consultations on INF (or the parallel START talks), 
·though President Mitterand has publicly and clearly 
supported the decision to deploy American medium-range 
missiles in Western Europe to offset the Soviet advantage 
in these weapons. 
Such are, .briefly summarized, the nuclear 
issues currently under discussion in most Community 
Member States. There is no question of the Community 
being involved_in the military nuclear controversies 
as such. They are not being debated by the EEC Council 
or by foreign ministers in the context of EPC. It is 
nevertheless evident that the preoccupation with the i • 
nuclear weapon issue in most Community co·untries and 
in many other countries as well, and the growing signi-
ficance-of security problems in EPC, make it impossible to 
· bypass these nucle.ar iaaues in any report dealing with 
European security. 
' . 
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THE GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. 
·······=······=····===·········==····=····· 
The inclination to compartmentalize the 
treatment of foreign policy issues into distinct 
categories and isolate those with security implications 
from those without security implications is gradually 
being overtaken by events. l~~Sues like defence planning ard _ 
~ deployment are obviously related directly to· defence am are 
dealt with in NA'!O and by national goverments -.not by the B:: ard 
EPC. 'lbe relations between .the &lrc::p!an Camllnity am many parts of 
the world, including the 'lhira worl.d; may be ecoradc and political 
but are rx>t deprived of security i.11plicatiorus, when one considers 
·for exanple the ~nee of Western EUrope on external supplies 
of raw materials. 1> 
The European Community is unable to project mili-
tary power on a Community basis to other parts of the 
world, including those from where the Community gets' 
its vital.supplies. Nobody can deny, however, the need 
to maintain conditions allowing for continued and un-
interrupted trade and the European .Community is in a 
position to apply both political and economic means to 
maintain those conditions. It would therefore be wrong 
to deny that the European Community, the largest trading 
bloc in the world, has a strategic role to perform 
in the world, even if that role is ·performed by non-
military means. It should be added that individual 
members of the Community are free to act in a military 
capacity and that military actions,· such as those carried 
out by France in Africa and by the United Kingdom against 
the Argentinian ~ccupation of the Falkland Islands 
do not require prior approval by the 
other members of the Community. 
The participation of certain Community countries~ 
1> 
No carplete inventory of the mineral ard vegetable raw materials 
available in the Caml.rlity exists. Hcwever, a useful survey 
with nuch practical informatim ard a rurtJer of recarmerdatia1S 
is ca'ltained in the report by Mrs •. L. rtoreau drawn LP a1 behalf 
of the Cannittee a1 External Eccranic RelatiCX'lS (Doc. 1-873/81>, 
which was adopted by the European Parl ianent a1 March 9, 1982. 
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in 'Peace-Keeping forces, such as in Cyprus and in the Middle 
East, most recently in Beirut, is also e~idence of the fact 
that Community Member States can and will play a military role 
outside the continent of Europe in the interest of avoiding military 
conflict. The participation of some Community coutries in the Peace-
Keeping Force.in Sinai marked a new and remarkable development, because 
this force is not a UN force. 
This participation reflects the strong European interest 
in the Middle East and a recognition of the need to 
make a visible. contribution to the preservation of 
peace b~tween Egypt and Israel. 
The relations of the Community with the rest 
of the world have an undeniable global dimension. This 
, is explained by a number of factors. The European 
dependence on supplies from Asia 1 Africa and Latin America 
has already been mentioned. Western Europe is 
dependept ·on other ~ountries for 75 pet cent of its.' 
· supplies of basic materials. The developing countries 
play a very important role in supplying the Community 
in view of the fact that more ~han half of 
the raw materials available on the world markets are 
produced in these countries. The EEC's dependence is 
likely to increase because of the relative scarcity 
of raw materials as compared with a foreseeable growth 
in requirements. Furthermore, prices will not only 
depend on the free play of competition but also on the 
political factors involved. The situation is aggravated 
by the fact that 75 per cent of the reserves of 15 
minerals are held by only five countries, which often 
. . 
· ..::c:..n<::llolde agre~-ments among themselves based as much on 
1 
.political considerations as on market rules. 
Western European dependence on oil from the 
Middle East is often quoted as an example of Western Europe's 
strategic vulnerability in light of the 
lack of a ~uropean military capability to protect its· 
1 
These figJres are q.JOted fran the JVbreau report op. cit. 
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vital oil supplies from the Middle East. 1 That situation · 
has been evident for.a number of years, however, and it 
has not led the members of the Eu~opean Community to 
take steps to try to· protect these vital supply routes 
by military means on a Community basis. However, some 
Community countries are militarily active, or could 
become militarjly active, in the area if required, but 
it is generally recognized that in terms of mili'tary 
defence the United States• role will in any case be 
vital. 
Whenever individual Member States of the 
·.Community .and Community institutions or the ten Govern-
ments acting collectively are taking steps in the 
political and economic sphere to protect the interests 
of Western Europe, it has a bearing on European security. 
It is also true that· it is a matter of concern,to the 
Community w~t kina of governme~t exists in the develop-· 
ing world. Through the Lome Convention the Co~uniey 
maintains particularly close relations with 6 3 develop-
ing countries, above all in Africa, and although the 
Lome Convention does not in any way imply a protective 
European role vis-a-vis the 6 3 rN:2 countri-es - and 
would be counterproductive if it did - it is in the 
interest of the Community that these countries act 
as free agents and do not become satellites of external 
powers. It is in the same vein that the Community will 
always be interested in encouraging a political evolu-
tion towards democratic and pluralistic·societieJ, 
though there is , of course, no attempt being made to 
enforce such developments on the part of the Communit~ 
------
l 
I 
I 
Theactive involvement of the Community and -its Member 
States is also evident in countries and regions which are less 
directly associated with Community than are the Lome countries. 
one example is the agreement concluded between the Community 
and the ASEAN countries in South-East Asia. 
1 This situation was dealt with in the report prepared for 
the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Diligent, Doc. 1-697/80-
adopted by the European Parliament on 19 November 1'981. 
- 43 - PE 80.082/fin. 
In the framework of EPC, the Ten have repeated-
ly expressed views on developments in Asia, ~atin 
America and Africa. Although such pronouncements and 
sometimes even actions can frequently be seen in the 
light of the humanitarian efforts undertaken by the 
Community there is obviously a distinct political per-
spective in such positions.~ 
They are implicitly, if not explicitly, designed to 
foster developments towards a greater degree of stabili-· 
ty as is1 for instance,the case in Central Ameriea. 
In conclusion, it is fair to say that although the 
European Community alw~ys and its Member States usually, abstain 
from direct mi~itary in\~rvention in Third World ~ffairs ': 
the Community has considerable leverage by virtue 
of its economic power to influence developments in 
various parts of the world. 
On a number of occasions the Community has 
flexed its e9onomic muscles. In May 1980, economic 
sanctions were introduced against Iran. They were 
limited in scope and had presumably little effect· 
Economic sanctions were introduced by the Community 
on 16th March 1982 against the Soviet Union _because 
• I 
of· devel.opmentsin Poland, and during the Falktand ·· 
:! conflict an immediate arms boycotfwas introduced followed , 
by an· interruption of all trade with Argentina until 
the cessation of hostilities when the restrictions were 
again lifted. 
Economic- .sanctions are normally not considered 
a v~ry effective_instrument of foreign policy. In a 
report prepared by Hans-Joachim Seeler for the Committee 
on External Economic Relations <Doc. 1-83/8~) it is clearly and in 
the v;ew of this rapporteur correctly stated ·that the history of 
economic sanctions is marked by· negative results and that economic 
sanctions have generall~ turned out to be ~ncap~ble of achievirig 
foreign policy goals. A similar view has been expressed 
by the US SecrttaiY of State George Shultz, thpug~ the 
United States• ~olicy in terms of economic sancttons es~ecially 
vi$-a-vis the Soviet Union has occasionally turned out to be somewhat 
different from that of the Member States of the European Colfimunity •.. 
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Whatever the effect of economic sanctions, 
such measures can under certain conditions serve politi-
cal purposes. The half-hearted European sanctions vis-
a-vis Iran in 1980 were less an attempt to force Iran 
to release the hostages than an act of solidarity with 
the United States. It is uncerta1n whether the economic 
sanct~ons by the Community towards Argentina had any 
significant results on ArgenT1ni'Em war -efforts~ but the -political a-nd 
psychological impact of the sanctions was cons-iderable. 
The recent examples of sanctions vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union and Argentina are therefore evidence 
of the willingness of the Community Member States to 
support their foreign policy declarations with actions. 
The extent to which such actions in the economic sphere 
can, in fact, contrib.ute to the security of the Communi-
ty Member States is uncertain. As an act of solidarity, 
a decision by the Ten or a majority of the Ten - as in 
the case o·f the latter phase of the Falkland conflict·-
i~ may well have consequences with a bearing on the 
security position of the Ten. This obviously also 
applies to a situation where the United States applies 
sanctions and the Member States of the Community do 
not. This has been clearly and most dramatically 
illustrated in the case of the gas project from the 
Soviet Union to Western Europe. 
- -
If European and American views on economic, including 
credit, policies towards the Soviet Union continue to diverge it. 
could have unfortunate repercussions for the Atlantic Alliance 
and consequently for the security of Western Europe. 
The risk may not be so much that either the United 
States or the European members of -~ATO w.o·uld reappraise 
their continued adherence to the Atlantic Pact. The 
danger is rather that a deep split between the United 
States and Western Europe could change the Soviet per-
.ception of the Atlantic Alliance and the United States' 
. . 
commitment to Europe in a way which could seriously enhance the 
threat to Western Europe. 
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NEUTRALISM AND PACIFISM IN EUROPE. 
·························=···=···· 
Th' rise of different peace movements and 
of anti-nuclear organizations of-one kind or anot~er 
has undoubtedly had an impact upon the security debate 
in western Eu-rope during the last few years. It appear• 
that as of 1981 onwards it has~ parallel i~ the 
United States, although there is not carplete similarity 
, between the so-called freeze movement in the 
United States and the anti-nuclear movement in Western 
Europe. 'lhe latter OJI'!Ptises1am:>J'¥3 others~ the unilateralists ~ are 
willing to do away with nuclear weapons on the Western 
·-side in Europe without any previous agreement with the 
Soviet Union to ensure that abolition of nuclear weapons 
is mutl.lal. 
There is no question that the peace movements 
in Europe have had an impact upon governmenaand that 
they reflec~ a considerable segment of public opini~n. 
How large and how important ·· · is very dif.ficult to . 
assess, because the term peace movement is used to cover· 
various group• and movements with somewhat different 
aims aad united only in their protests against what 
t~,y consider to be a continued arms race ahd, especially, 
a continued nuclear arms race. 
Some of the peace movements focus on the 
planned depl9yment of American medium range missiles 
from 1983 onwards in order to prevent the decision from 
being implemented. Others support unilateral Western 
European renunciation of all nuclear weapons and the 
wi.thdr:awal of all American nuclear weapons from Europe. 
Others advocate a freeze at the present level of nuclear 
weapons. Others are directed exclusively against the 
United States under President Reagan and others again 
are protesting against both superpowers. · · 
. . -I n an a t t em p t . t 0 a n a L y s e -whether the 'riSe "of the 
peace movements and anti-nuclear groups is likely to 
have a lasting effect upon the conduct of the securit~ 
policy of all or some of the Community Member States, 
t'he first question to ask is if the current trend will 
lead any NATO member state to leave the Atlantic · 
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Government declarations and party programmes clearly 
indicate a preference for the continued existence of 
· the Atlantic Alliance and those groups almost exclusi~ely 
- I 
to be found on the extreme left, who want their countries 
to leave the Atlahtic Alliance are quite obviously a 
minority,_ even a rather small minority. 
Disagreements are much more discernible 
when it comes to a d'finition of how to implement NATO 
policies. Pub~ic opinion polls-~' perhaps not ~~ 
unexpectedly,· that the majority of Europeans are in 
favour of NATO and.are against a heavy reliance on 
nuclear weapons for the defence of Western Europe. 
At c~a ~arne t~me only a minority is ready ~Q support 
'• 
increased defence expenditure, which could strengthen 
the conventi~nal defence postur~ and·dimin~sh the depend-
ence on nuclear weapons. 
-· - -------- -- - ------
It e:ris ~ to•~ ·th:¢.·tfe~'~·n04at~~>~ ItB9E 
meetings and demonstrations against nuclear weapons · 
notwithstanding, do not·~ffer a clearly defined alter-
native security policy. 1here are obviously strong 
neutralist currents both within and,to a lesser extent, 
outside the peace mov~ments. Insofar as they advocate 
alternative policies to continued membership of NATO 
they do not seem to favour the establishment of an 
independent Western Europ~ with its own armed forces. The 
neutralist tendencies seem rather to go hand in hand 
with pacifism and a widespread, if by no means unanimous, 
view is that Western Europe should withdraw from 
unhealthy military competition between the two super-
powers and base its future security on being 
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more or less disarmed or only lightly armed and certain~ 
ly wi~hout any nuclear weapons on the continent. J 
However, even the British Labour Party,which is official·, 
ly committed to ~uclear ·unilateralism, has no majority in 1 
favour of outright withdraw~l from NATO. 
Others. who lean towards at least the objectives 
of some of the ~eace movements. want to renounce nuclear · 
weap·ons in Western Europe, _but advocate at the same tille. 
an increased rearmament to equip western Europe with 
a more credible conventional defen~e posture ta enable 
the West to accept a no-first-use of nuclear weapOns 
·doctrine.to w~~~~- ~he $oviet Union already professes 
to adhere. 
In some countries, and notably in the Nether-
lands, the churches play an important rQle in the-peace 
movements. Public opinion polls indicate a widespread 
~upport for the-large scale peace demonstrations and 
especially the opposition a9ainst the planned-deployaent 
of medium-range mi.ssiles. 
Public Qpinion polls may not be the most 
instructive guide to the comp.lexities of foreign policy 
and security issues. A simplified question (Are you 
for or against nuclear weapons in Europe?) is likely to 
. . 
provoke an equally simplified reply. However, the 
sentiments opposed to a further increase of the nuclear 
weapons arsenal are evident, even if they in no way 
constitute a.clear-cut alternative to present·security 
policies. 
A recent American Congressional publication 
dealing witb the crisis in the Atlan~ic Alliance contains 
a warning example of how mutual perceptions can take 
extreme forma. In Europe, it ~s said,nmuch of the Media 
and certain leaders of the anti-nuclear movement painted 
the picture of the United States gone wild, bound and 
determined to confront the Soviet Union led by a reck-
less cowboy with six guns at the ready... In the Uni~ed 
States, corresponding images characterized the Europeans 
as weak-willed pacifists, duped by Soviet propaganda, 
manipulated by the KGB and ready to unfurl the flag of .· 
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surrender at the first sign of trouble. 
It would certainly be premature' and probably also 
unrealistic to view the current trends as an indication Of 'n 
early breakup of the Atlantic Alliance. There seems-
little likelihood that the.security system which· has 
existed in Europe for more than ~0 years; with the-United--· 
States and the Soviet Union both playing vital roles 
within their respective alliance systems, should cease · 
to exist or even radically change. 
For the purpose of· this report, it is of 
particular interest to note that the present restless-
ness with the existing security system and especially 
with the role played by nuclear weapone1.is not associated 
with any new plan to give the European Community its 
own independent military dimension. Most peace demon-
strators seem unwilling to face the choice of whether 
a Europe more independent of the United States than at 
present shpuld be armed at all. 
Because EPC must occasionally focus on and, 
identify areas where European interests are not identi·· 
cal with those of the United Sta~es, EPC does c~ntain 
a certain appeal to the neutralist left in Western 
Europe, although the left-wing neutralists usually 
view EEC with considerable scepticism and are generally 
hostile to the idea of an integrated (Western) Europe. 
As nine of the ten Member States belong to the Atlantic 
Alliance (although France has been outside the military 
arm of NATO since 1966) and have no intention whatsoever 
of leaving the Alliance, there is no anti-American bias 
built into EPC. But in view of the divergent US and 
European views on a number of economic and even political 
issues, such a bias may be perceived by those who would 
like to advocate and encourage anti-Americanisn. 
1) 
Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance. A report 
prepared for the Committee on Poreign Relation&, 
US Senate, Washington, March 1982. 
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This does not by itself create the necessary 1 
political conditions within the Community Member State•· \ 
for the e•tabliah .. nt of a common European defence \ 
entity. It uy, howeftr, have an ia~Paet upon the ' 
perceptions which will eventually-fora part of a Bur.,.an 
security concept. 
There is no n~d for Western Europe, •ven in 
time~of deep ctisia vis-a-vis the United States, to 
provide a ail_it.ry defence against North America. · Onlj 
a tiny ainority will alle•e that the United State~ 
constitutes an armed threat against Western Europe, 
-· ~ . ' .... ~~-- -----------
however much manY o~ople rt~ay dislike the policies or the ·verbal 
·e-xt--ravaqan~~-s·--of -theeu-;:-re~tUS administration. Anti-Ameri canana--
~ti-nuclear sentimehts may encou~age neutralist -tendencies ----, 
·i·~-~J;-s-ie rn --E1,.1rope, but-ff-th'E!y should co-ntinue to-g row, 
--- -----
--- ----they_are more likely t~ lead to a 
fragmented aurope than to a united Europe with ita own 
foreign polioy and own defence establishment. In short, 
ne-.trali•• alid pacifia provide no viable alternative 
to the present -.ourity concept. of two opposing alll• 
....... 
' 
': 
I 
-I 
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·CONCLUSIONS. 
··········=· 
·---- -----~---- ------
People impatient with the progress of European 
integration, amply represented in the European Parliament, will 
sometimes feel tempted to call for the revival of the European 
Defence Community. This is not realistic under present 
conditions. It is also considered highly undesirable by many. 
A new treaty setting up the framework for a 
European defence entity would not be signed by all 
Member Governments and probably ratified by even ~r. 
It would stir new controversies which would harm the 
present Community and it could have a paralyzing effect 
upon the p~ogress of European Political Co-Operation. 
This also explains why this report is not 
recommending the setting-up at the present time of a 
. 
:. 
i 
i 
separate committee, or a sub-committee under the Poli-
tical Affairs Committee, to deal with security problems. ~~ 
Such a procedure could isolate security issues from the 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y c o n t e x t -w tie r e t h e y "'tfe l o n g • : 
But if the European Community has a future 
at all it is inevitable that security and one day even 
defence will become part of it.· The absuraity of 
building up a European economic and political entity 
and ignoring forever security and defence has been 
pointed out by many. It was succinctly put by Mr. Leo 
Tindemans in his far too ofte~ overlooked report on a European 
Union in 1975. It has been underlined several times 
in debates in the European Parliament long before the 
Parliament was directly elected. It has been clearly 
stated by the present President of the European Commis-
sion, Mr. Gaston Thorn. The ~nscher/Colombo initiative 
is directed towards creating a more satisfactory link 
between Community policies and foreign and security 
policies. · 
It is logical and indeed necessary that securi-
ty considerations are now officially part of the agenda 
of European Political Co-operation. It is also a 
fact that increased attention is now being given to the 
role in a European industrial policy to be played by 
i' 
I 
. t 
,: 
~ 
! j• 
~ 
l 
I 
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a comMOn !uropean approach to arms development, arms 
procute_.ht, arMs r&search, and arms sales.1) 
Hawe~er logi~al the connection between 
security, toteign policy artd community affairs, talks, 
reports ana blueprints do not constitute the nee~i•ary 
political b41il fot building a European defence commu-
nity •. It is this rapporteur's view that it would be 
a fundam~hta1 •tror to focus exclusively or even 
primarily on an irtstitutional solutidn to the proble~ 
of integrating security and defence fully into the 
affairs of the .community. In fact, as the Community 
has developed it is logical 
to assume that a truly integrated European defence 
will constitute the final phase of the whole EUropean 
integration pt.ocess. Few people ~uld dare to set·. a 
date for tbe likel~ achievement of thi• goal. 
It ia the thrust of this report that without 
a military dimension, and even without an openly stat.a 
comncn ••curit~ policy, the Communi~y Member States 
a~t: neverthelees developing a joint security concept • .. : 
Thisgrows out of decisions taken both on a national 
level and on a community level. 
A Euro~ean identity is not created simply 
by a'ccepting a !JOvernmental declaration on the subject as was done 
a decade ago. tt is being created by an increasing 
number of decisions made and attitudes taken by the 
~en - and sometimes more than the Ten - focusing On 
those element~ which are uniquely European. The mote 
European decisions and attitudes, the more substantive 
will be the Europe·an identity and subsequently the 
'. 
correspondl~g European security.concept. 
1> This is the principal tq>ic of the forthcaning F~ report 
for the Political Affairs Carmittee. See also the speech bY 
Mr. Christq:Jher Tugerdlat, Vice-President of the CQnnissiO'l, 
m May 14, 1981 m the Camulity dimensim to El.lrq>e's defence. 
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This process is forced upon the Community 
by political and economic developments in the world, 
by new and existing trade patterns, by availability 
of resources and by many other factors. 
It is being made increasingly clear 
that European countries have a growing number of iden-
tical interests. It is also clearer today than before 
that these interests are not always identical with 
those of the United States, the principal guarantor 
of European security. 
This does not mean that diverging security 
interests will lead to tb~ breakup of the Atlantic 
Alliance. If that. happened, it would be only as 
as a result of miscalculation on either s.ide of the 
Atlantic. The more that common European interests 
are ident~fied and perceived, th• more effectively 
they can be managed. 
The Atlantic security link can therefore 
be handled more confidently, both when the sharing of 
interests between North America and Western Europe 
can lead to joint or parallel actions and policies, 
and when recognizably different American and European 
interests require different actions and policies 
executed with the understanding that the security 
rel~tionship need not, indeed should not, be fatally 
harmed. 
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ANNEX I 
SUMMARY OF MINORITY OPINION IN THE COMMITTEE BY THE RAPPORTEUR, PURSUANT TO 
RULE 100, PARAGRAPH 4 
When the report was put to a vote in the Political Affairs 
Committee, there were 33 votes in favour, 5 against and 4 abstentions. 
It is not possible to summarise jointly the views of those who 
either voted against or abstained, because their views differed and 
their motives varied. Mrs. Hammerich (of the Group for Technical 
Co-ordination) found the report to be in violation of the Rome Treaty 
and dangerous from the point of view of peace in Europe and in the 
world, paragraph 5 being the most dangerous paragraph. 
Mr Capanna, an a~ternate Member from the same Group, 
saw the report as contributing to a European security community with 
the inevitable result of bringi·ng about a military industrial complex 
within the Community. This could lead to 'adventurous military interventions' 
by the Community outside Europe. 
Mr Balfe, of the Socialist Group, voted against because the 
report was in contradiction to the position taken by his party, the 
Labour Party, on unilateral nuclear disarmament. 
Mr Ephremidis, of.the Communist Group, considered the report to 
be in violation of the Treaty. He has found several imprecise formulations in 
the explanatory statement. 
Mr Kyrkos, of the Communist Group, while recognising the 
validity of many parts of the report, took exception to its political 
line, which was contrary to his own political beliefs. 
Mr Plaskovitis, of the Socialist Group, could support many 
•/""'• 
parts of the report, but was dissatisfied with the Rapporteur's unwillingness 
to give explicit attention to the special position of certain Member countries, 
politically and geographically. 
Mrs. van den Heuvel, of the Socialist Group, expressed herself 
in favour of several parts of the report, but took exception to paragraph 5, 
and consequently abstained in the final vote. 
. 
~. 
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THE NATO DOUBLE OEC1510N 
12 December 1979 
Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers 
Brussels ( 1) 
Chairman: Mr. J. Luns. 
ANNEX II 
Quantitative and qualitative improvements to Soviet long range nuclear capability 
-Modernization and expansion of Soviet TNF- Parallel courses of TNF moderni-
zation and arms control - European deployment of US ground-launc;hed systems -
Withdrawal of /000 US nuclear warheads - Proposed mclusion of US and Soviet 
long range theatre nuclear systems in arms comrol efforts - Special high level 
consultative body on negotiations in the field of arms limitations. 
1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th 
December 1979: 
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the 
political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing 
momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up. 
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capa· 
bility in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe und huve a 
strategic significance for the Alli:mce in Europe. This ~o;itu<~tion h<Js been espe-
cially aggmvated over the· ·tast few yc:~rs l'ly Soviet dccis1ons to implement 
programmes modernizing and exp;anding the1r long-r;mge nude:~r C<IJlability 
substantially. In particular. they have deployed flic· SS-10 miS!iilc. which ·olfefs 
significant improvements over previous ~ystcms in providing greater lii."Cur.acy. 
more mobility. a Ad greater range. as well as having multiple warheads. and the 
Backfire bomber. which h:~s a mu'ch better performimce than other Soviet 
aircraft deployed hitheno in a theatre role. During this period. while the Soviet 
Union has been remforcing Its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear 
Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively. Western LRTNF capabil-
ities have remained static. Jndeed these forces are increasing in age and vulner· 
ability and do not include land-based. long-range theatre nuclear missile SYS· 
tems. 
4. At the same time. the Soviets have aiM> undertaken a modernization and 
expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality 
of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the back· 
ground of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of 
parity in inter-continental capability with the United States. 
S. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance. because. if 
they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could 
undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on 
the credibility or the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the 
spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to agression. 
6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete ~tions on 
the part of the Alliance ir NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain 
( 1) France did not panicipate in the Special Meeting. 
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credible. After intensive consideration. including the merits of alternative 
approaches, and after taking note of the positions of (;ertain members, Ministers 
concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance ould best be served by 
pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization 
and arms control. 
7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the 
deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II 
launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing 1-A, and 464 Ground 
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations 
currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the 
programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain 
support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrange-
ments. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear wea-
pons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF 
modernization. 1.000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as 
soon as feasible. Further. Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads 
should be accommodated within that reduced level. which necessarily implies a 
numerkat shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other 
types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted With satisfaction that the 
Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an exammation of the precise nature. 
scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and 
their possible implications for the _balance of roles and systems- in NATO's 
nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will lorm the basis of a substan· 
tive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980. 
8. Ministers attach· grear lmportanceTolhe- role-of arms--control in contributing 
to a more stable military relationship between East and West and m advancing 
the process of detente. This is reflec~ed in a broad set of initiatives being 
examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and. detente 
in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's 
efforts to assure the undiminished security o( its member States and to make 
the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, 
and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard 
they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards 
achieving these objectives. 
9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking 
account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO. 
arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower 
levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain 
US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous 
Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control 
negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of 
willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United 
States following consultations within the Alliance .to negotiate arms limitations 
on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as 
pOssible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive 
consultations within the Alliance: · 
A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre 
missions should be accompanied ""by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre 
systems. 
I 
' 
I 
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B. ijmitalions on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should 
be nesbtiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step 
approac~. 
C. The immediJte objective of these negotiations should be the establish-
ment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear missile systems. 
D. Any asreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the 
principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should ~ke 
the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights. 
E. Any asreed limitations must be adequately verifiable. 
10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security 
of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted 
within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow 
the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence 
Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in 
other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings. 
11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complamen-
tary approaches in.order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet 
TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and 
defen« and thus maintain the security of 1ts member States. 
A. A moder-nization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is 
necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible 
response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation 
for the pursuit of ~us negotiations on TNF. 
B. Success of arms control in -constraining the- Soviet· build•up can~hance 
Alliance security,ln<ldify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements. and promote 
stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of 
deterrence, defence-·ana-detente aseifuneiifeG"1lflhe·Harmel Report. NATO's 
TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached 
through -negotiations. 
........ __ 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-931/80) ANNEX III 
tabled by Mr SchaL-l, Mr Lucker, Mr Klepsch, Mr Verg~er, Mr. von Hasse~, Mr Adonnino, 
Mrs Gaiotti de Biase, Mr Janssen van Raay, Mr Penders, Mr Pflimlin, Mr d'Ormesson, 
Mr Herman, Mr Fischbach and Mr Pottering 
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrat Group) 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
--~ .,_; 
on,European political cooperation on matters of security policy 
The European Parliament, 
- conscious of its responsibility to the citizens of Europe on all 
issues of vital im~ortance to Europe, 
- aware of the rol• which the European Community must play and of the 
need for it to make a significant contribution to international peace, 
- awate of the disturbing increase in the level of armaments, which 
also imposes serious burdens on the developing countries, 
- conscious of the commitment to safeguard human rights, which is 
inseparable from the commitment to the security and independence 
of nations, 
- aware 'of the need to guarantee the security of shipping routes and 
international trade in the interests of the economy of Europe and 
of all nations, 
- deeply concerned at the grave international political situation, 
- having regard to the worrying fact that the invasio~ of Afghanistan 
and the brutal Soviet repression has remained a 'fait accompli' 
despite condemnations from all over the world and the brave resistance 
of the Afghan people, 
- having regard ~o the instability of the international political 
situation, in which major economic and social disparities and the 
Rh<•rp increase in areas of tension may provide opportunities for 
or provoke military adventures, 
- whereas the present situation dangerously weakens the prospects 
for disarmament and makes it mere difficult to achieve the necessary 
reduction in nuclear arsenals, 
- aware of the fact that the growing concentration on military 
expenditure in the industr 0 ~- 0 .. ~ ~ dl • ...t dt. c loping cour tr ::.es a like 
intensifies the in.bu Joance ', th"' ·onr ld economy and l.ncreases the 
risk of tepc:i., 
c.:.mvinced that detente is indivisible and inevitably depends on our 
countries taking joint coordinated measures to deter any aggression, 
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1. Strongly urges the Member States of the community to include in 
. ,. 
th~ir sphere of responsibility and in the context of political 
cooperation all aspects of the serious threat to world peace and 
the security of the nations of Europe as well as that of the more 
directly threatened countries of the Middle Bast posed by the 
soviet occupation of Afghanistan and to take the necessary atepe 
to guarantee international peace and the security of the nations 
of Europe; 
2. Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to submit to Parliament 
a report on security and defence questions based on the following 
political premises: 
3. 
- the realization that there is no alternative to the political and 
military alliance between the United States and Europe - an alliance 
which has in the past provided and still provides a guarantee fOr 
international peace and security and which has demonstrated its 
peaceful, defensive and democratic nature over the past 30 years 
and that complete solidarity with the UQited States is therefore 
compatible in this respect with a joint European initiative: 
- support for all political moves that genuinely aim at securing 
ar~ limitation subject to controls, an important contribution to 
the protection of nations and the progress of d'tente; 
- intensification of political and economic cooperation with the 
Third World and increased support for countries particularly hard 
hit by curtent developments; 
- support for the western European Union and its Parliam.ntary· 
As~Jembly, which are responsible for arms policy an,d' arms control, 
and for the e~forts of tla Atlantic community in aec\irity matt.ers: 
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the council, 
the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the 
governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Commis•ion 
of the European Communities. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION .,DOC. 1.,.,30181) 
tabled by Mr Lomas, Mr Seal, Mr Caborn, Mr Megahy 
".pursuant to Rule 25 of the RUles of Procedure 
on peace and detente 
The European Parliament, 
- notes the constructive proposals made by President Brezhnev 
in.his speech to the Congress of the communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, 
' 
-notes particularly the following proPosals:-
l. the calling of a Special Session of the Security Council 
of the United Nations with the participation of top leaders 
of Member States and other states to look for solutions 
to prevent war, 
2. the holding of Soviet/United States talks at the highest 
level, 
3. agreed advance notification of military exercises in the 
whole of the European USSR with corresponding extensions 
by the West, 
ANNEX I IV 
4. concrete negotiations for Par East confidence building measures. 
5. an international agreement on the Persian G~lf Which could be 
discussed along with the international aspect of Afghanistan. 
l. Calls upon the Governments of all Member States and the 
United States to respond poli.tively to these proposals and 
to make genuine efforts to improve detente and cooperation 
in ~rope and the world, 
2. Instructs the President to forward this resolution to the 
Governments of the Member States and to the Government of the 
United States. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (QOC. 1'-:4~7/8'1) 
( . ' . 
~-; ,. . ' ~-
tabled by Mr S~hal.l, Mr P.edini, M·r d'Ormes~, fit~. vdn Hasse~; ··ttr:"~t•rllslen van Raay, 
Mr Fischbach, Mr Herman .. , ,, 
on behalf of the Group 'of the Eu~~ 'People's ;petf~ <C~iitian•D ... oeratic Group) 
pursuant to Rule 47,-~f the RuLe~ of, P~edur~· ·,: . .-/ · : ·· ·~ .;> ~' ., 
... . . ; \ ,· . It:,; 
on the two-r*a~t ffATo. decision · ~-~·.:. , 4,~; :;a .. · ·-.. --
---- ~- ---· ----------· _ _:__ ___ ~ . ' -~ ··o:t~- ~.:-
· ... 'I! 
'~ . lo,"~" ...... 
~.~·;. ·~~:·: . {' The European larliamen~. ·~ ~-... 
,. 
-conscious of its responsibility aa a direc~ly-~~ ~li~t·fat' 
i 
the security of the European partner states, 
{':., t t, ' • i .. · ,J 
hnving regard to the anili tary supe~:.ior.i.ly of the . .USAw Pi\<..'f· o~~ 110\~; 
"' ~lt . ' ' ' • "' • ' ...... - . . ! 
particularly !ollodng .the inttoducti()tl o! ~sovlt't n\i~l(•ar ~~--~ -: '· 
. ,,K . 
weapons, aqainst· which NATO baa nothing comj)akabM, to offer~.~· ~· · · · · 
... . . . . { . 
' • . . ~ ." , r ~· 
I I :.,~I" ·• .. ~ 't J·. ' 
deterrent, 
- recognizing that the measures decided upon in~ .1~-..:-. ·the.: 
' 'r . '.:. ' ' 1 ' ;: ~ ~ .. 
supreme NATO bodies to mocterhize their Euro-e,trat-,£0' we&pdnl cad at. 
the same time to o~fer :to neqoti'ate on di~ti:ipteaellft~~ ::~,. t • .· 
de~ision of fundamental iilportan~~· . .partiO\\J.a~t~·' ~ -tke s~r .~.(: · 
• .,-.~. • • 1 j • • • f . ~r ~~ * ~. · :t;t .,_,. 
the European p~rtner eta~••· .. ·r_,,,:~. ~· .. ,. ':·:··.;· .. ~.:::~·;::,; ··~~ ·:~. 
having re-gard to the de.cisiotls by the ~ur.an~ 9~"eriwents ·10.~~::~0 
the tso=part NATO decision, albeit;. ~r.~r~n,·:~~~~· i~~.·~&· •. 
convinced that detente, the sec:w;it~y o:f. the . .-tloh~ 'of ~~~· 11\Vtu~l. 
. ' J•' ,; ' . 
balanced dUarllall\ent talks betwen. Bast and West tn .. .futw:e wUl.be 
• ~' . • , ' ' ~ : ! 
centrally and· f\lndamentally clepeadant. c:m this deeie;i~, ·· ·· 'i. . 
• ··- . •t. ' '• . 
, ,•<i1• .1:.. I •i- '• , , 
' - having regard to the wave ol ~opafanda and effa.ts t6 create~40rt~ion 
directed primarily at the European
1 
partner ··statal:.~ tbe sO.i~t_ "Unton 
and to the threats of various politit!al" activi.~ .by tht. So(rt'at ~ ·. 1 
Government desiC]ned to prevent NATO"I\Odt!rni,zatitt{ follbwincJ t~. 
previous unilateral arms bu:Ud-ltp ·})y .the WARSA1f P~ aa4 to ~- about 
the cancellation. o~ 1 f:llG. NATO -twoW-~t. dec::~~:ion.- ... , . ,, \:c:':, 41.-"··: i.·J · · •• 
concerned at t.he 9rowin9 influence now being ·exertod on security ft.uee 
in lar9e areas of public opinion 'by emotioqs · arouse<S '6V poli tica~· ·,' · 
pa:ties and the media, which .is i~· line wi'fh Ud f~~s f.0~4tt . _ 
security strategy and is li~ely to weak~n tn~.cona~us, ~ng the 
· European meinbe'rs of NATO and encour-age oppoai{ticn to· Onitec! 'ltath. 
' ''I ' 
security policy. 
1. Reaffirms, in the light of the security interests and the desire of 
the nations of Europe for peace, detente and mutually balanced 
disarroament, the necessity of modernization in the field of Euro-
strategic weapons as an essential counterdeterrent and simul-
taneously arid independently thereof an immediate resumption of di•ar~ 
rnamcmt talks: 
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2.· Repudiates the threats issued by- the ·s~et Qov~nment ·to inctlvidual 
European blembers ,of NATO and t~e Eur~ .:PUblic ·•· gros•. ~t~·.:, ·! 
ferenoe in thtt\.,m~at impoctlnt Qher·e. of 1overeign atat•• ._ ..... ~1 
affairs, .·.~ . . . 
' 
'l' '.' 
-------------- --_..--_---J__ ---- ---- -,.........--._..,.......,_....:--- ~--·.:.·-
3. 
4. 
Calls upon and encourages- t'be national ·:goverruae~ts 
-~! 
European states, the Council ~d NATO, , : · , 
. I . : ~ , 
- to adhere unc;onditionally t~ thP t~par'b.-: NJ\'10, ~l·ciaion an4 · 
thus enaU&"e the secu:d ty o! Butrope and 
to counter one-aided Soviet propag~nda. by ~ovi~ing ma.rfe ... ·'1 . :;,-, •• 
inforination to clarity ·the security ia1tues invo\ved lnlJ.-;J.[tn 
• f- ' ' • 
these mere clearly· to ~he P,Ublict. 
L .. :,,< 
In•tructs the President of ·th~ Buropean Parliaaent to forward ~i~ 
resolution to the NATO Stipteme C~d, thi! c"otmcil, tht· c..t.. • .t.on, 
• - l # ' ! .. ..,. 
the national qoverlliM!nts of the Metlber S~tes aftd to bring ·it .1:9 '>\ 
the attention of the European public.. /j_· ~ : 
\' 
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MOTION fOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-700/81) 
tabled by Mr Efr.-idis, Mr 'AdafttO'U.;and "r Alavanos 
I •, ' ' ' 
.. 
·, ' 
':''\ 4' 
... 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Aulea of Pr.oa,cture ·., 
t ' ' ,-
ANNEX VI 
on the European parlia~~ent 's support .for the Me•r: &~te' of-:tht ,EEC ·tp their 
l endeavou~s for peaat . 
- , • I I 
. .. 
: ,• .t-J \.I 
--·-. --· - ·--- -- ----- __ ____.._ ____ .:____:_._,_~-~--.... .a._.'-'-- ...-----~ 
wherean the 1982 dra-ft. preliminary bud~t of 'the European · · 
Communities now under diacussion 1ncludea expenditure on 
research in the n~clear sector, 
- whereas proposals have recently been. made seeking systematic,-, .•. 
ally to develop the European Co~ities into a militarY 
Community (Genscher proposals·) , ~ build up the DC' s naval 
,. power (decision of the Political AffaiR COIIIIftitq.e) and --·to 
encourage the European Comm\lni tiea to play an active role. , . 
Within the framework Of the ·dangei!OUS CCld ~&r ltOli~y of·: . 
'' 
' j ' ' ' l ! ~ t 
the USA ancl NATO (Coaiaaioner l'uCJSncShat' • 1titeaa~a~a) ·, · ;· 
- whereas the problem-of European securftY ~~- now reached an 
oxtremely critical point, part.t.culat-ly tollowiri9 the de- , · , 
, . 1 , , . I 
eision to base Pershihg II and Cruise nucl-ar missiles in 
member countries of NATO, and in the ~ight ·of the production 
of the neutron bomb by·,the USA and the p.t:omoHon of plana-
to develop it in- the Mellbe.r States 6t 1 the EBC following 
• I • . 
the statements by AmeriCan officials on l~ted nuclear war, 
- \-lhereas all the countries of Weat;em Europe·· ate in .ferment 
•·· 
•.· 
.-~. 
in an unprecedentedly power~ul ·mass. movement &9~1nat nuclear 't i ~ •• :, ~· 
weapons and the neutron bomb that embraces the ~plea of 
all our countriea re9ardless of pol~tica.l ~n'UA.s1on, 
' I, 
whereas the European Parliament, which is elected by direct 
universal suffrage, canno~ ignore thit. foremat problem c,n-·, 
earning the peoples of ou~ coun~1r4,ea1 . . ... , ' f: 
Resolves ·' ·' 
1 • To express its support for the peoples of WEis tena , EuroPe • ·· 
in their endeavours to remOve the nuclear threat, to p~Ote 
d6tente and to bring about ·a reduction in the !ll~l of ;~~-
a.rJDa.ments ,. fully sharing the.tr deep an_xiety for the fu~-:- 4 
of peace ill Europe, . · · 
'·· 
• \ I 
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1. 
--·- __ ... _ -~ <I ~3\0o\:d .':·101;) ~~ni_HJ.~O~ifSi A itO Wlfli'l•; 
nF,..a..- ''Jol 9lf,pftlllf1·~~~).- i,t4J.~-.:>~~;~ ... w.~~~ VL•b:>ldf:i 
' pel propOaala -of _leA'c!an o~ the ~x-opean CoMun! ties ~Jt~~g • · \ 
to brinq about the open i.a-l~t of ;the ~ in the ~-i, :. 
'(•' : . . . . ·' ~, 
cold war poU.cy aa4 to o-.wrt ~t into ~ ·JUOpeal'l bzubk , · 
• I, {I. ,• 
of 11Ato1 .,.t. . · ·vt 
,( ' .·• j' 
I ' "'I • '·: i'~':_l • ,·,' 
3. To examibe wi tb special can th• allocat.~ -ol appropn.t.torril 
4. 
5. 
:in the U82 draft bucJiet·-and t• 4elet·th0t· directly· or · 
incU.rtotly connecta4 wu~ ~Urtaq .•U'f;~;~~cul.arly .ip the 
nuclear sector, · · · · 
To 4e=lare itself-1ft favour. of the ~•te opening.of 
neqot1at.ions to achieve a b.t~e at the lowest posatt.l'e 
. . . 
lev·l~ &8 &i deoiaiw ·~ .l.ft \he p~a of JRtua1, con~Uec! 
' - ' • ' l 
• ~ .. j.' . J 
. ' 
Xnatructl its P:ree14ent. to. forwarc\ this resolution to the 
CC*liaaic.m, the C01incil ·aDA the: Gcvel'nJMin~ .. 'l,t -~• -llibe~. , 
. . .r. . '. . • • ..... ;'>~~ ltates. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION CDOC.1-760/81> 
tabled by Mrs Gaiotti de B'h1se, Mr ~le,:tsch, Mr 'VergHr; flfr SitiiOnnet,· Mr Htf"'ftan, 
l . .~ Mr Ligios, Mr Macario, Mr Ghergo and Mr Pischbach· . 
Qn behalf of the .Group of ~he Eur~r. .P~bple' ~ P~rt~~ -~.co ~ro~) . ' ', 
with request for topical and urjen,·~.)te¥ pursulnt lbc ~l.fl•. 4~-- of .f.hi ,Ruln of Proced 
. ; ~ • ' ! . • ' 1/. 
dn balanced and controlled disa~~ .. -~ 
'!· I: 
--------- - -------:------, 
:r.'-'-~-:-.!~X upPil n J'ar 1 i am~nt., 
whereas the Geneva arms negotiati~ns open on 30 November 198l, ,·. 
'~ . 
. , ... 
- c<-'nsidering that, by launching .their politic<H initiative, Eur;9pean., 
. . . : ' 
governments helped to pave the way for .these negotiations, 
reaffirming its own commitment to peace, being t&ken to mei!lll i~ 
. ' 
'f ' •• ! I .-~ 
. ' 
(.l) 
(b) 
(c) 
I 
eompleta openness t:o nc.-yotialibl'1 tand dialogue ~'t 
searching for means to establish mutual trust, 
economic cooperation ~nd balanced 4evelOPmeftt ·~gat·all;the ~~les 
. ' . ' 
of the world, /. 
- ~ ~ 
(d) furtherance ot. democracy aa4 human, xighta~ 
- aware of the duty of a parliament elected ~ univ.rsal suflr~ io 
• 1, fl 
represent the hopes .~ .a'spirati'onit; _'of a~l EurQpean_ peoPle.ti-· ~-peace_. 
' • • < ~ -:..t ' . 't-. ' . . 
nware of the need for, the princi,Plea of·'.He:~\nl(.,t.. :to be· reaPS>li,.ed in 1 
a coherent m~nner so that, fot' ex.Jnp1e-, A~ni~tap ~~ains' ·aJlf ... · ., 
determination ahd the situation fn.:Po~a'hd is·allaw'*cS._ tp. de~· ... ' 
peacefully withbut interference, · .·· · ~ ..t. . ··.·: .': · · • • • ,.,. 
,;- .: ·.~··L·-~,-, _.-~'!'·~;-'>:;:,.~. ·.·· ·;,_ 
1. Requests the governments of the ~£*! ta}tinq. #&Jrt/:··1~' the ··.a~ · · 
negotl~tions beginnihg on. 30 NoV.,~r l9sl to·;ur•~ ~~ith ·.;:~ \it~aos't 
I ' . ~. ~ , . •' 
·determination the objective of __ bal~ced ini controlled redaCtion· 
• ' ~· .. ..., t'• • . f -
of nuclear an~. conventional 'weoo~e to the. i~' pos!tibl.e levelt 
. . . ·· .. :··· .. .' .··-'_h" ;'. ,, .. 1.,.·.; ~ 
2. call_s on tho President of tbe ·~oun~il and the· gOvernments of' the 
Member States 'to engage i'n transpcu-ent and ~~er,tad political'. 
c.OQperation to be able to bring d~e .infl';Jellce· t4 qtar in the. 
defence of European interests in the cause of pf~qe and'se.cur1t_r. .. 
wi thip the frame~rk of the Atlantic alli~c~ .. •Dd r~ ~~ita,~ ~~- i .. 
controlled disarmament;: -,?," • '' 1 ·' .,_., 
. .} ' 
3. Instructs ita President to forward thi1 resolution to the·eoQbeil' 
., 
. ,• 
.l 
·y 
• i 
,. ; ' 
l 
and con\miae'ion. ·t • ~ ,t:" ; • • . 
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XI X3Vi~A ANNEX VIII 
- ....... -... .... - ......... -~ 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-766/81) . 
( ~.:~\ .~(}~'- f h )~:n~~> ~1·J.~ fl, .. i(l2JS~ l\ :~c~-; Vt0l f·.Jf\1 
tabled by Mrs Lizin, Mr Boyes, Mrs Baduel~lorioso, Mrs Castellina, Mrs Cinciari-Rodano, 
Mr· Michel, Mr Capanna, Mrs Clwyd, Mrs Ewing, Mr Balfe, Mr Vandemeu~ebroucke, Mr Griffiths, 
Ms Quin, Mr Lomas, Mr Hu.e, Mr Ceravolo, Mr Ferrero,MrVitale, Mr Papapietro, Mr Bonacini, 
Mr de Goede, Mr Eisma, Mr Veronesi, Mr kyrkos 
with request for urgent and topical debate 
pursuant to Rule 48 
on peace in Europe 
recalling the deep attachment to peace of the peoples in Europe: 
not:l.ng that recently, in Bonn, ROme, r.ondon, Brussels, Paris, 
A~sterdam and other cities, well over a million people have demonstrated 
against Europe becoming the battleground of a m.tclear conflict: 
concerned that while resources are wasted on nuclear weaponry, the 
pressing needs of econon,ic and social developmen·t in the third world· 
are inadequately.met: 
noting that negotiations are due to start on November 30 between the 
. UnitE'd States and the SOviet Union about arnts reductions:-
1. calls on the negotiations to take account of the wishes of the 
people of Europe, who : 
reject the installation of new ~TO -.uium-range missi~es on .European 
soil: 
seek the dismantling of similar miss~les installed by the SQviet Union: 
reject the deployment of neutron bombs in Europe: 
- want gradual elimination of all nuclear weapo:ns in Europe: 
2. Urges that every effort be made to promote world peace: 
3. calls ~n its President to transmit this resolution to the Commis$1on, 
the co~ncil, the governments of the Member States, of all other 
European States, and of the USSR and the USA.' 
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ANNEX IX 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION CDOC.1~904/81) 
tabled by Mr Gl inne; Mr Jaquet, Mr G. Fuchs, Mr Hansch, f!lr va11 Miert, ·M·r B. Friedrich 
Mrs Focke, Mr Zagari, Mr Carigl ia, Mr Dido'_ and Mr J .• _ Moreau 
... 
on behalf of the SociaHst Group 
~ursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva 
------------
. 
. The European Parliament, 
- having noted the recent statements as to the possibility of limited 
nuclear.war in Europe, 
- having regard to the deployment of Soviet SS 20 missiles, 
- having regard to the danger of Pershing II and cruise misaile~ .. being 
installed by way·of retaliation, 
1. Reaffirms that disarmament, non-use of force and recourse to · 
international arbitration must continue to be the guiding 
principles of all responsible political action~ 
2. Expresses tbe wish that the negotiations between the USA and the 
USSR which resumed on 30 November should have as their objective 
a reduction of armaments and tension in Europe and lead 'to effective 
and simultaneous disarmament guaranteeing the security of each 
nation ~nd its right to self-determination~ 
3. Expresses its resolve to press for.the necessary balance of forces 
to be ach_ieved in Europe at the __ lQllfest level, by tbe dismantling 
of ss 21'1 .'!llissile·s together with the non-installation of Pershing II 
and cru-1ee·.missiles, · and by endeavouring also to achieve a balance 
- at the lowest level - of all medium-range nucl•ar weapon systems 
in Europe: 
4. Endorses moreover the aim of the total abolition of medium-range 
nuclear weapons in Central Europe.: 
5~ Considers that the success of the disarmament negotiations in respect 
of both nuclear and conventional weapons presupposes the attainment 
of an overall balance of fo~es, of such a kind that neither side.can 
gain advantage over the other: 
6. Wishes the European Parliament to follow the progress of the 
nP.qotiat~ons staqe bvstaqe and to adopt a position in the light 
of the concerns expressed above~ 
- 72 - PE 80.082/Ann.IX/fin 
7. Zxpresses finally its sympathy with the attitude of the hundreds of 
thousands of men and women who recently underlined, by their 
demonstrations, the fact that the maintenance of peace is the 
prerequisite for social well-being and who, in their vast majority, 
are motivated by the desire to safeguard peace and strengthen under-
. ' ., " 
standing between·peoples through a resumption of the East-West dialogue 
and intensification of the North-South dialogue: 
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign 
Ministers of the Ten meeting in Political Cooperation and to the 
Council and the Commission. 
- 73 - PE 80.082/Ann.IX/fin. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIOt.l <DQC. 1-76ft/lit> 
tabled by Mr van Aerssen, Mr Kltn).~c;h, Mr von l!l9.$,4\ ... Mr G'l,\(.~~ i~ ~ d'Qrrnesson, 
Mr Penders, Mr H.erntan, Mr M{JI)tr, f4r Hi.bH"U~~~~' Mr. ~4.r.,,.,'i., "r $:i.lli;'WJ.'t, Mr • .,,~uo~r, 
Mr Katzer, Mr Estgen, M.r Adon.ninq, rtr ~ellllftc,t.r, Jllr d•l(tM.rt~IVJP, ftt. ~l lh,.tc,, 
Mr Deschamps, Mr Hoffman, Nr QrQk, Mr NotttnbQam, ff\r Gb't:'~ rtr~ ~~-·~ .. ~MO. Cl\trretti, 
Mr oocklet, on behalf of the Group of the European ~.aple'$ P•rty, 
for entry in register 
pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Pr.oced.ure 
on the violation o.f. Swedish territorial waters by ~ ~oviet ~ubQF!i:.Of., 
The European Parliament, 
- deeply shocked by the news of the presence of a Soviet s.ub~~~~. 
equipped with nuclear weapona, intercepted and boarded in Swedisb 
territorial waters: 
1. Condemns this viol.tiQn of in1;.,J;"naticmal. law, Q( th• ,c(nl~u.-,i,g;n~y 
of a neutral stat~ and of th• Helsi.nk~ Final ~ct ~~9b va• -~•Q 
signed by the USSR: 
2. Notes that the Swediah authorities have expressed th• fear that 
the Soviet eubmarine had released nuclear mine• in th• •ur~o~n4~ng 
waters: 
3. Expresses its ltYJa.~tbf tQ the S'(•!Ji•b. ~Qple •nQ ~~..:~n..\ 41.\4. 
its admiration for their resolute attitude in thit ,ituatiQJH 
4. Considers that this unfriendly act by th~ USSR i., t~9~fi~~~~ 
with its own proposals to d~nucleariz• the Ar~ti,~ ~nQ itl.~~~ w.~~'~s: 
s. Demands that tb• negoti~tions which are about to c~nce in Gfn•va 
and which concern a mutual reduction to the lowest possible l•v•l 
of European strat~ic nuche~,r W4il!~n• ~th9ul4 ~• ~ttJ·M int,q ~n ~ 
spirit of sincerity ~4 IJIU~u•l l:loneety, which fr~f.UPW-S•s tbat t)),e 
incident which took PlKtt in Swedtm cannot be re~n~a "'n""' U,f 
circumatances: 
6. Instructs its PrOfi~t t9 forward this resolution to th. r~eiif 
Ministers of the ten Member States of the ~i~Y • ._~i~ ~~ 
political cooperation and the Sv,.4ish, soviet ,na U~it94 $~-t,. 
Gov4U'nlllen te • 
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ANNEX XI 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-268/82) 
tabled by Mr Ephredemis, Mr Adamou, Mr Alavanos, Mr Lomas, Mr Boyes, Mr Balfe, 
Mrs Clwyd, Mr Megahy, Mr Caborn, Mr van Minnen and Mr Seal 
Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the second UN Special Session on Disarmament 
'Ihe Euro~an Parliament, 
A. whereas the second UN Special Session on Disarmarrent will be held in June; 
B. aw,,re that,. particularly over the last. few 1101ths, new cleroonts of inter-
national tension have built up \<'ohich threaten world peace more than ever 
before; 
C. considering that the enonrous expenditure on a.nns, particularly nuclear 
weapons, the production of the neutron barb, the deployment of new weapons 
systems, the prarotion of plans for chemical and other weapons of mass 
destruction, the use of and threat to use the 'food weapon' and the intensi-
fication of the climate of war, are matters of grave concern to the pecples 
of the world and threaten the human race with extinction; 
D. considering that peace is the ccmron heritage of all mankind, that tr.ere , 
is no alternative and that, consequently, its defence is both the duty of 
all peq>les and all governments and also a basic human right; 
E. considering that peace can be maintained and strengthened by halting ·the 
anns race, reducing military expenditure and by encooraging disarmanent; 
F. recognizing the close link for all coontries between di.sarmarrent and inter-
national security, the econanic and social developnent of nations and the 
establishment of a new world econ.anic order 1 
G. whereas these considerations carry particular weight for Eurq:le, where 
there already exists the greatest cax:entration of nuclear weapons and 
where plans are being advanced for the installation of new weapon systems 
(Pershing II, Cruise, neutron batt>), while the doctrines of 'limited nuclear 
war' and 'first strike' oo Fllropean territory are beinq put forward; 
H. recognizing the urgent need for the cancellation of these plans and for 
action to reduce the nuclear arsenal to the lc::Mest possible lEM!l with a 
view to the carplete rerroval of all weapoos of mass destruction fran the 
Eurq:~ean continent; 
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1. recalling that at the first UN ~ia+ ,_e,~ian ~Pi~~~ lt7f, 
the Merrber States . of thE! United Nati~, incluair.lv d¥,e Melliler St4~ 
of the E&:, resolved tp take act~ in tt.Y~ PI -~ .- ~ 
only solut~on tor t)le survival of mankind; 
1. CALLS ON: 
·a) the Menber States to cootribute with all ~ans at their disposal 
to the success of the second UN Special seP~ .on ~; 
b) the governments of ·the Merrtler St,ates, who apm:mted the <iecltJ:"~t.~ 
in the final document o~ the first special Sessioo in l978, to 
neet the obligations entered into; 
c) the governments of the ~ States to t:R aU. ~~AJI:V ~ 
- by radio, television etc. - to inform their ~lq of the ~ 
arising fran the prc::xllctioo of nucle4r UIJPQRIJ Mel other~ of 
mass destructioo, and of the benefits of a policy of al1ll$ ~ipn 
and disarmament; 
d) the goverments of the MadJer States to. reap:xui llQii~.i\W~Y to tile 
qesire of their people for dis~t. MP'"•' .j.n ~~f.jM: 41!aRl-
str ations 1. 
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolutioo to the ~i:J. Gf. th!t 
Eur~an Camllnities, the qowrnmeilts of the ~r St4tes .S to the 
Secretary~ill of the UN. 
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